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1. Testimony before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development on S.B. 357, tape
1, at 1 (Mar. 5, 1979) (testimony of Ron Habitzreiter) [hereinafter cited as Testimony on
Economic Development]. Transcripts of this testimony obtained by the authors are on file at
the Underwood Law Library, Southern Methodist University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although a few persons have characterized the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices--Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) as a "finely tuned piece of
legislative machinery," 2 many of the witnesses who testified before the leg-
islature during the 1978-1979 session believed that the Act was poorly
drafted and subject to widespread abuse.' Before the 1979 amendments, a
seller could be found liable for treble damages for even innocent misrepre-
sentations. There were virtually no defenses to a charge under the original
DTPA, and even the defenses adopted in 1977 have proved largely illu-
sory.4 Furthermore, although the Act ostensibly provides for treble dam-
ages in order to give the consumer an effective remedy in cases involving
sums otherwise too small to warrant litigation,5 it contains no limit on the
size of claims to which it applies. Accordingly, judgments under the Act
have been obtained for several millions of dollars,6 and even small injuries
have been artificially expanded into substantial lawsuits through the use of
claims for mental anguish 7 and other forms of consequential damages.'
2. Introduction to D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGA-
TION at ix (1978) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION].
3. See Testimony on Economic Development, supra note I, tape 1, at 3-15 (R. Jack
Ayres), 15-19 (Robert A. Mann), 20-24 (Ron Habitzreiter), 24-34 (John Coates), 34-43
(Mark Hanna).
4. The bona fide error defense is a prime example of this problem. It has nothing to do
with the defendant's honesty or good faith, as the words seem to suggest, but instead pro-
vides a defense only in situations involving clerical error. See Complete Floor Discussion
on S.B. 664 [Committee Substitute], Mar. 30, 1977, quoted in TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGA-
TION, supra note 2, at 191 n.46. See also Testimony on Economic Development, supra note
i, tape 1, at 9 & 21. But see McNeely, Consumer Protection, Business Lobbies Say It's a Law
for Lawyers, Austin American-Statesman, Jan. 7, 1979, § C, at 7, col. 3 (evening ed.)
("Longley says honest errors are forgiven by an amendment of the act in 1977, which con-
sumer lawyers agreed to."). The bona fide error defense appears to have been derived from
the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1976). See Complete Floor Discussion on
S.B. 664, supra. Decisions under the Truth-in-Lending Act have clearly limited the bona
fide error defense to clerical errors. See McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir.
1978); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
The tender or settlement offer defense has also been of limited usefulness due to obscure
wording, excessive demands by plaintiffs, and a very short period of availability (30 days
after written notice is given of the consumer's complaint). See discussion of § 17.50A at
notes 265-308 infra and accompanying text.
5. Hill, Introduction, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 614 (1977).
6. See Testimony on Economic Development, supra note 1, tape I, at 43-44 (judgment
obtained against city of San Antonio for more than $5,000,000 before trebling due to injury
to janitor from gas leak); Note, Treble Damages Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act, 15 Hous. L. REV. 212, 222 n.97 (1977) (discussing Stokes v. Bird-
song, No. 12102 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 52d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Apr. 13, 1977) in
which judgment was entered alainst the defendant for $3,829,291.44 after trebling because
peanut seeds sold to the plaintiff failed to grow).
7. See Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619, 620-22 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (jury finding of actual damages of $387.71, plus
$1,300 in mental anguish and $750 in attorneys' fees, before trebling; total award of almost
$6,000 for $387 injury, $3,900 of which was for mental anguish; appellate court set aside
damages for mental anguish as not authorized under Act). See also Testimony on Economic
Development, supra note 1, tape 1, at 14 ($75,000 claim for mental anguish unaccompanied
by physical injury); id. at 23 ($3,000 damages awarded for defects in automobile and $1,500
for mental anguish, trebled for an award of $13,500 to the consumer, plus $14,000 in attor-
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As a result, sellers accused of making misrepresentations or of breaching
implied warranties have often been subjected to the unpleasant choice of
capitulating to demands believed to be unfounded or of defending the
charges at the risk of financial ruin.9
The business community quite properly sought redress from the harsh
effects of the DTPA at the 1978-1979 legislative session.'" None of the
witnesses before the legislature, however, suggested that the consumer
should be left unprotected. Even the most ardent DTPA reformers wanted
merely to limit the potential for abuse inherent in what they perceived to
be an overly broad and poorly drafted statute." No evidence was
presented by those opposing reform that the DTPA had resulted in more
accurate marketing information. Indeed, most of the examples presented
to the legislature to demonstrate the need for additional consumer protec-
tion involved fact situations for which sizeable recoveries would have been
available under well-recognized principles of common law fraud.'2
Although efforts to reform the DTPA were certainly not unexpected, the
press greeted these efforts with alarm' 3 and tended to exaggerate the effects
of the 1979 amendments.' 4 The level of rhetoric in the press reflected the
extreme statements of the partisans. Opponents of the amendments con-
tended that they would "turn the state's current consumer protection stat-
neys' fees, resulting in a total award of $27,500 for a $3,000 injury); id. at 36 (buyer sued
broker for $4,000 in actual damages, plus claim of $10,000 in mental pain and suffering, on
allegation that he should have known of foundation problems; potential exposure of
$42,000, exclusive of attorneys' fees, on $4,000 claim).
8. Testimony on Economic Development, supra note 1, tape 1, at 28 (defendant sued
by farmer for $27,754.67 for lower crop yield than previous year in connection with crop
spraying job costing farmer $210).
9. See Testimony on Economic Development, supra note 1, tape 1, at 38 (testimony of
Mark Hanna, representing the Texas Association of Realtors). Hanna contends that most
members of the Texas Association of Realtors are small businessmen with modest incomes.
He states that there are hundreds of suits pending across the state, any one of which could
put the defendant out of business.
10. See McNeely, supra note 4, at 7, col. I, for a list of some business groups that sought
modification of the DTPA in the 1978-1979 legislative session. Those mentioned in the arti-
cle include the Texas Automobile Dealers Association, the Texas Association of Realtors,
and the Texas Retail Federation.
I1. A number of witnesses complained of excessive demands made by plaintiffs attor-
neys. See Testimony on Economic Development, supra note 1, tape 1, at 5-6, 8 (Ayres), 28-
29, 33 (Coates), 36 (Hanna).
12. See notes 90-92 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Consumer Act Under Attack, Austin American-Statesman, Feb. 1, 1979, § A, at
14, col. I (concluding that Sen. Meier's bill amounted to "throwing a wrecking ball at a
building because of one broken window"); McNeely, Consumer Law Targeted, Austin
American-Statesman, Jan. 31, 1979, § B, at 2, col. 3 (referring to Sen. Meier's bill as "an
onslaught on the Consumer Protection Act of 1973").
14. Hightower, Peering Into the Worst Session in Memory, The Texas Observer, June 8,
1979, at 2 ("Realtors and auto dealers performed a little surgery on the state's Consumer
Protection Act, cutting the law's treble-damages provision down to a nub .. "); Vaughan,
A Little Hurry-Up Deal, The Texas Observer, June 22, 1979, at 16 (refers to the "bill that
gutted the 1973 Consumer Protection Act"); Woolley, Pondering the Accomplishments of the
Lobbieslature, Dallas Times Herald, June 1, 1979, § C, at 3, col. 4 ("The legislature also
corrected a couple of its past mistakes. It realized that some consumers actually were getting
some protection from the Consumer Protection Act, so it amended it into a Consumer De-
struction Act.").
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ute into a paper tiger,"' 5 and would leave the Act "on the books in name
only."' 6 On the other hand, business groups argued that the Act is "a law
for lawyers more than consumers."' 7 As it turned out, however, neither
position accurately characterized the Act as it finally emerged from the
legislative session.
The 1979 amendments are what one would expect from the circum-
stances that produced them, a compromise between contending factions. It
is true that an attempt was made to limit the harsh effects of the Act; it is
not true, however, that the Act as amended no longer protects the con-
sumer. In fact, in some respects the 1979 reformation confers greater
rights on the consumer than the original Act. For example, the failure to
disclose information concerning goods or services may now be actionable
under the DTPA in circumstances that would not have given rise to a
claim at common law or under the old DTPA."8 Thus, the new amend-
ments may have created a duty to speak in situations where none existed
before. The 1979 amendments also substituted "producing cause" for the
"adverse effect" requirement and thereby may have deleted any foresee-
ability test for damages.' 9
On the other hand, the consumer is now limited to actual damages and
attorneys' fees for innocent mispresentations. To obtain treble damages
under the amended Act, the consumer must prove that the defendant had
actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or prac-
tice.2" While this is a more rigorous requirement than under the old
DTPA, it is still less stringent than the common law. Thus, damages that
are essentially punitive may be awarded under the 1979 Act for something
far less than the conventional showing of malice or intent to injure re-
quired at common law.2'
The amended Act also provides the defendant with a few meaningful
15. Garrett, Consumer Group Attacks Softening of Consumer Law, Dallas Times Herald,
Feb. 24, 1979, § A, at 18, col. I.
16. McNeely, supra note 13, § B, at 2, col. 3 (quoting Senator Lloyd Doggett).
17. McNeely, supra note 4, § C, at 7, col. 1. One of the witnesses before the Committee
on Economic Development also complained that the Act "has the effect actually of making a
lot of consumer attorneys wealthy." Testimony on Economic Development, supra note i,
tape 1, at 21. Indeed, lawyers were deeply involved on both sides of the controversy. The
legislative activities of lawyers with consumer practices who were involved in opposing the
1979 amendments are briefly discussed in Bishop, Consumer Act Misunderstood, Austin
American-Statesman, Feb. 23, 1979, § A at 3, cols. I & 2 (criticizing the Austin American-
Statesman for relying on statements by legislator with consumer oriented law practice); Mc-
Neely, supra note 4, at 7, col. 3; Testimony on Economic Development, supra note 1, tape I,
at 17 (witness with 60% to 70% of his practice in consumer related matters). See also Tiede,
Senate Consumer Rights Leaders End Filibuster, Gain Concessions, Dallas Times Herald,
Apr. 10, 1979, § B, at 4, col. 3 ("'I'm providing the hall,' Hobby said. . . . 'But this is a
question of plaintiffs lawyers arguing with defense lawyers, and I can't make much of a
contribution.' ").
Representatives of the defense bar also appeared before the legislature. See Testimony on
Economic Development, supra note 1, tape 1, at 24.
18. See discussion of § 17.46(b)(23) at notes 76-172 infra and accompanying text.
19. See note 221 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 40-54 & 233-36 infra and accompanying text.
21. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
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defenses that seem to be patterned after the common law. For example, a
seller who relied in good faith upon written information furnished by
others and merely passed the information along to the consumer, will now
be able to assert a defense to a claim for damages.22
While the final product of the 1979 revisions is difficult to evaluate at
this time, it appears that the legislature made a small but generally solid
step forward. The drafting of the amendments, however, like that of the
original DTPA, is not exceptional. Phrases and words clothed in a long
history of common law are sprinkled throughout the statute with little in-
dication that the legislature fully appreciated the effects of the terminology
used. 23 Nevertheless, the clear intent of the legislature was to mitigate the
harsh effects of the pre-amendment DTPA and it appears to have made
measurable progress toward that goal. As discussed more fully in part III
of this Article, however, the Act needs further revision.
The 1979 amendments to the DTPA became effective on August 27,
1979. The full impact of these amendments will not be felt in the courts
immediately, however, since the legislature provided that the amendments
were to be applied prospectively only.24 The Act expressly states that it
has no effect either procedurally or substantively on any cause of action
that arose either in whole or in part prior to its effective date.25 Thus, cases
are likely to be governed by the 1977 DTPA for some time to come. For
that reason, this Article attempts, in discussing the amendments to the
DTPA, to compare their effects to case law under the old statute wherever
possible.
An effort has also been made to draw upon authorities from jurisdic-
tions outside Texas to supplement Texas decisions or to deal with issues
not covered by Texas cases. Frequent analogies have also been made to
federal case law, including cases arising under both the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the federal securities laws. The references to federal
case law are not limited to cases arising under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, however, partially because such cases are frequently not helpful
in analyzing the amended Act, and partially because the Texas appellate
courts appear to have overemphasized Federal Trade Commission cases in
interpreting the Act to the exclusion of other potentially more relevant au-
thorities. 26 Furthermore, this broader approach to federal law is validated
by the amendment to section 17.46(c)(2), which deletes reference to inter-
pretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act in private consumer ac-
tions and provides instead that in construing the DTPA, Texas courts
"shall not be prohibited from considering relevant and pertinent decisions
of courts in other jurisdictions. '' 27 This change should have a beneficial
22. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 603, § 1, at 1331 (to be codified at TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50(B)(a)) [hereinafter cited as 1979 DTPA].
23. See notes 216-29 infra and accompanying text.
24. 1979 DTPA § 17.46 note.
25. Id.
26. See notes 176-81 ifra and accompanying text.
27. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(c)(2).
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effect on future judicial decisions under the Act since both courts and prac-
titioners will now feel free to search out the best available precedent.
This Article does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of the DTPA
or even of the 1979 amendments. Several topics discussed in this Article
could, if fully developed, become the basis for other articles. Of necessity,
therefore, much of the analysis is stated succinctly and, in certain respects,
incompletely. Similarly, there are passages from the recent amendments
that could be analyzed only in terms of the literal meaning of the words
since neither pertinent case law nor legislative history could be found. Fi-
nally, no attempt has been made to review developments concerning the
DTPA not directly related to the amendments. What follows, then, is a
section by section analysis of only those portions of the DTPA amended by
the Sixty-sixth Texas Legislature.
II. A SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS
A. Section 17 43. Cumulative Remedies and Double Recovery
The DTPA has never been the consumer's exclusive remedy for un-
dermade and oversold products. From its inception, the Act has provided
that its remedies are in addition to remedies provided by other laws.2 8
Negligence, products liability, breaches of contract and warranty, as well
as common law fraud actions, provide alternative and useful methods of
recovery in a variety of fact situations. By enacting the DTPA the legisla-
ture has merely engrafted another statutory cause of action onto those al-
ready in existence. As amended, section 17.43 now states explicitly that no
recovery is permitted under both the DTPA and another law for both ac-
tual damages and penalties for the same act or practice. 29 Thus, the new
amendment merely clarifies the pre-amendment principles of law that
would have precluded multiple recovery.3 °
In Riverside National Bank v. Lewis,3 the only decision discussing the
issue of multiple recovery under the pre-amendment language, the court
denied recovery of both punitive and treble damages on the grounds that
28. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 322.
29. As amended, § 17.43 provides:
The provisions of this subchapter are not exclusive. The remedies provided in
this subchapter are in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided
for in any other law; provided, however, that no recovery shall be permitted
under both this subchapter and another law of both actual damages and pen-
alty for the same act or practice. A violation of a provision of law other than
this subchapter is not in and of itself a violation of this subchapter. An act or
practice that is a violation of a provision of law other than this subchapter
may be made the basis of an action under this subchapter if the act or practice
is proscribed by a provision of this subchapter or is declared by such other law
to be actionable under this subchapter. The provisions of this subchapter do
not in any way preclude other political subdivisions of this state from dealing
with deceptive trade practices.
1979 DTPA § 17.43.
30. See Huggins v. Carey, 108 Tex. 358, 194 S.W. 133, 135 (1917).
31. 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, writ granted).
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this would constitute a double recovery based on the same act. 32 The un-
derlying premise of Riverside is that an award of exemplary damages can
be justified only if there are uncompensated actual damages to support it.
If the consumer has recovered damages under another theory of liability
for the same act, he has already been compensated for actual damages. In
that event, there can be no recovery under the DTPA and hence no judg-
ment for treble damages. If, on the other hand, the consumer has been
awarded a judgment on the DTPA theory of his case, he has been compen-
sated for his actual damages; in that case, because punitive damages may
be awarded only where actual damages also have been awarded, 33 the con-
sumer would be precluded from recovering any actual or punitive dam-
ages based upon any other coextensive theory of liability. Double
recovery was therefore precluded by principles of law already enunciated
in cases and statutes prior to the 1979 amendment. Thus, the 1979 amend-
ments to section 17.43, which expressly proscribe multiple recovery,
merely clarify existing law.
Section 17.43 was further amended to emphasize that violations of other
laws do not necessarily result in a violation of the DTPA. Thus, the de-
fendant who is found to have violated the Truth-in-Lending Act, for ex-
ample, is not automatically in violation of the DTPA.34 On the other
hand, another statute may expressly provide for a remedy under the
DTPA. For example, a violation of the Mobile Home Standards Act is
expressly made a violation of the DTPA by the Mobile Home Standards
Act itself.35 Whether conduct not specifically proscribed by the DTPA is
nonetheless a violation of the Act therefore depends on whether the statute
that does specifically proscribe the conduct makes an express reference to
the DTPA.
B. Section 1745(9)." Scienter
Prior to the 1979 amendments, only four of the twenty-two proscriptions
contained in section 17.46(b) included a knowledge or scienter require-
ment, and only one of those four actually used the term "knowingly. ' 36
The other three proscriptions used terms such as "intent" or "fraudu-
lently." 37 The 1979 amendments now require that a consumer prove that a
defendant knowingly violated the DTPA to recover treble damages.38 Sci-
32. Id. at 561.
33. Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934).
34. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Heights Sav. Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221(0, § 17(d) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
36. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46(9), (10), (13) & (17) (Vernon Supp. 1978-
1979) [hereinafter cited as 1977 DTPA] require some culpable state of mind. Only
§ 17.46(13) uses the term "knowingly." The following cases acknowledge that the DTPA
generally contains no scienter element: Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978);
Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ filed). See also
Lynn, A Remedyfor Undermade and Oversold Producs-The Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698, 717 (1976).
37. 1977 DTPA §§ 17.45(9), (10) & (17).
38. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1). The plaintiff can recover treble damages, even without a
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enter need not be proven, however, to recover actual damages.39
Knowledge Requirement. "Knowingly" is now defined in section
17.45(b)(9) as actual awareness of the falsity or unfairness of the act giving
rise to the consumer's claim.' In the context of a breach of warranty,
"knowingly" is defined as actual awareness of the act or practice constitut-
ing the breach.4 ' Although "awareness" is not defined by the Act, the
words of the statute, as well as the use of the term "awareness" in other
contexts, indicate that the statute requires a greater degree of conscious
action or wrongdoing by the defendant than is required for actual damages
at common law.
To prove common law fraud in Texas, a consumer must demonstrate
that the seller intended that his statement of a present fact would be relied
upon by the consumer.4a The consumer is not required to prove that the
seller knew his statement was false or that the seller intended to deceive
the consumer.4 3 Innocent misrepresentations of a past or existing fact are
actionable at common law.' Statements made by the seller in reckless
disregard of the truth are also actionable.45 Exemplary damages at com-
mon law, however, may be awarded only when the consumer proves the
seller acted maliciously or with the intent to injure him.4 6
By comparison, the 1979 amendments require actual awareness of the
falsity for recovery of up to treble damages.4 7 No scienter, not even the
intent to induce a purchase required for common law fraud, 8 is necessary
in the proof of actual damages under the 1979 DTPA, except for those
provisions of the "laundry list" that specifically require it.49 Similarly, to
showing of knowledge, for the first $1,000 of actual damages. See notes 233-39 infra and
accompanying text.
39. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
40. Id. § 17.45(9) provides:
'Knowingly' means actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of
the act or practice giving rise to the consumer's claim or, in an action brought
under Subdivision (2) of Subsection (a) of Section 17.50, actual awareness of
the act or practice constituting the breach of warranty, but actual awareness
may be inferred where objective manifestations indicate that a person acted
with actual awareness.
41. Id.
42. Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. 1974).
See also Comment, Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 27.01. An Alternative to
Federal Securities Fraud Remedies, 33 Sw. L.J. 703, 716-20 (1979).
43. Id. See also Booth v. Coward, 265 S.W. 1026, (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt
adopted). Opinions and representations regarding future events, however, cannot be the
basis for actionable fraud unless known to be false. See Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Brooks v. Parr, 507 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1974, no writ).
44. Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. 1974).
45. Id. at 143.
46. Dennis v. Dial Fin. & Thrift Co., 401 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. 1966); Briscoe v.
Laminack, 546 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
47. 1979 DTPA §§ 17.45(9), .50(b)(1).
48. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. The following discussion between Sena-
tors Meier and Doggett reflects the intent of the drafters:
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recover treble damages, the consumer has a far lighter burden to shoulder
under the DTPA than in common law suits for exemplary damages. On
the other hand, the scienter requirement is not satisfied by proof of negli-
gence or recklessness. Actual awareness, and not the fact that the defend-
ant reasonably should have known that a condition existed, must be
proved by the consumer in order to recover treble damages.5" The Act
expressly provides that actual awareness may be inferred from objective
manifestations.5' The Act, however, does not speak of constructive knowl-
edge or of knowledge imputed by law; therefore, only actual awareness of
a falsity appears to be sufficient. 2 Accordingly, under this standard, a de-
fendant is not chargeable with actual knowledge of a fact simply because
he had access to it.53 Similarly, an agent's knowledge will not be imputed
to the principal simply because of the agency relationship, although the
principle may be liable for punitive damages when he expressly authorizes
or ratifies the conduct giving rise to the treble or punitive damages.54
DOGGETT: Sen. Meier, let me ask you a question about this amendment,
because I think what you've done is a positive step as to this amendment.
Do I understand that you are deleting for purposes of a recovery of actual
damages and attorneys' fees the requirement of knowingly in Subsections 5
and 7 of Section 17.46(b)?
MEIER: And-yes sir, that's all it does.
DOGGETT: All right. And that is as-so that in terms of getting actual dam-
ages and attorneys' fees, there is no requirement of scienter, of knowingly or
intentionally, you do have the requirement of unconscionability to get treble
damages, but there's no state of mind, intent, knowingly or whatever, that you
have to do to get your actual damages?
Debate on Amendments to S.B. 357, Senate Floor, Apr. 10, 1979, at 8-9 [hereinafter cited as
Senate Floor Debate]. Transcripts of this debate obtained by the authors are on file at the
Underwood Law Library, Southern Methodist University.
50. The term "aware" is commonly defined as "having or showing realization, percep-
tion or knowledge." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 61 (1971). See,
e.g., Daniels v. Berry, 148 S.C. 446, 146 S.E. 420, 424-25 (1929) (Court found that bank
directors were not liable for damages under allegation that they should have known a condi-
tion existed when the statute required them to be "aware" of a corporation's insolvency.
"Aware" defined as: "apprised; informed; cognizant; conscious."); Raney v. Mack, 504
S.W.2d 527, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ) (no liability for fraudulent con-
cealment unless defendant "aware" of undisclosed facts).
51. See note 40 supra.
52. See, e.g., Becker v. Central Tel. & Utils. Corp., 365 F. Supp. 984, 989 (D.S.D. 1973)
(awareness denotes more than imputed legal knowledge).
53. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of America v. Commerce Bank, 505 S.W.2d 454, 457
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (bank not liable under statute requiring "actual knowledge" merely
because it could have discovered breach of trust by inspection of public records or by piec-
ing together facts known by bank employees).
54. Generally, a principal is liable for the actual damages suffered as a result of an
agent's misconduct committed within the scope of the principal's business. See Citizens
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Munly, 518 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ);
Fleming v. Lon Moris College, 85 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, no writ). The
principal, however, is generally not liable for the exemplary damages of his agent except
where the specific conduct giving rise to the claim was authorized or ratified by the princi-
pal. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Scurlock Oil Co., 447 F.2d 947, 1004 n.12 (5th Cir. 1971);
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967); Ledisco Fin. Serv.,
Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). But see
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979); Medical Slender-
izing v. State, 579 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
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Whether a corporation is liable for treble damages if it has within its
files information that would make a statement false is an open question.
Arguably, liability for treble damages in such situations would encourage
the dissemination of correct information throughout the corporate hierar-
chy. The DTPA, however, requires actual awareness of falsity for treble
damages; mere knowledge of information by a corporate representative
without knowledge by that same person of the statements that were made
should not be actionable. The Act seems to require the defendant to be
conscious that the disseminated information is false. Because it is an or-
ganic whole, a corporation cannot be aware or conscious of the falsity of a
statement unless one or more of its representatives are aware of the state-
ment, the correct information, and the relationship between the two. It
would therefore seem appropriate to require proof of actual knowledge of
the falsity by those corporate representatives who were actively engaged in
the transaction before treble damages are awarded. Such a rule would
satisfy the literal meaning of the language of the DTPA in treble damages
cases without encumbering the consumer's right to actual damages.
Section 17.45(9) also deals with the type of information of which the
defendant must be aware. The Act provides that the defendant must be
aware of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or practice for the
plaintiff to recover treble damages." Proof that the defendant knew the
falsity of a statement is applicable only to misrepresentation cases; actual
knowledge of the unfairness of the deceptive act or practice relates to un-
conscionability claims.5 6
Breach of Warranty Claims. The amendments provide yet a third stan-
dard for breach of warranty claims: actual awareness of the act or practice
constituting the breach of warranty. 7 Since the inception of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), an innocent and unknowing breach of warranty
has given rise to a claim for actual damages. 8 Punitive damages, how-
ever, are not awarded under the UCC for simple breach of warranty. 9 In
contrast, under the pre-amendment DTPA, treble damages were automati-
Longoria v. Atlantic Gulf Enterprises, 572 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
55. 1979 DTPA §§ 17.45(9), .50(b)(l).
56. A few courts interpreting the pre-amendment DTPA required scienter, or at least
proof that the unconscionable act was not performed in good faith. See Southwest Lincoln-
Mercury v. Ross, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ);
Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 381-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ). In
Singleton the court of appeals implied an intent element under the 1975 DTPA definition of
unconscionability to preserve the constitutionality of the Act. Id. The 1977 amendments to
the DTPA specifically defined the act or practice of unconscionability and thereby probably
resolved this particular challenge to the Act's constitutionality. Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 1,
at 600.
57. 1979 DTPA § 17.45(9).
58. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-1, at 272 (1972) ("A seller can fully believe that the representations
he makes are accurate and yet find himself liable for the breach of an express warranty.").
59. U.C.C. § 1-106; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.106 (Tex.. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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cally awarded for any breach of warranty.6" The 1979 amendments seem
to return to a middle ground between the UCC standard and the pre-
amendment DTPA standard, permitting punitive damages for breach of
warranty only when there is a showing that the act constituting the breach
was committed knowingly. The words of the amendment suggest that the
seller needs to know only of the act or practice that ultimately causes the
breach and need not be aware that his conduct constitutes a breach of
warranty.6' Application of this provision may be complicated, however,
by differences in the types of warranties involved.
If, for example, a merchant knows at the time of sale that his product
does not conform to the promises made on the container or label, or that
he is not the rightful owner of the goods, sale of the goods constitutes a
knowing breach of an implied warranty of merchantability or title that will
subject him to treble damages. 62 In such circumstances, the defendant's
knowledge of the act or practice constituting the breach consists of an
awareness of a defect or nonconformity in the goods or services at the time
of sale.63 The same result would seem to pertain to express warranties
where the defendant was aware at the time of sale that his product would
not perform as promised. Such conduct would seem sufficiently reprehen-
sible to justify punitive damages.
In cases involving warranties of repair, however, awareness of the act or
practice constituting the breach may consist of nothing more than a refusal
to make the repairs, conduct that will always be deliberate and knowing.
If the refusal to repair arises from a good faith dispute as to the scope of
the warranty or the cause of the breakdown, punitive damages would not
seem appropriate. Nonetheless, the Act as written may authorize punitive
damages even in such circumstances.
Unconscionability Claims. The scienter requirement is more easily ap-
plied to unconscionability claims. A consumer may claim, for example,
that a sale involving a gross disparity in value between the consideration
received and the consideration paid constitutes unconscionable conduct.64
To recover treble damages in such circumstances, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant was aware of the unfairness of the transaction. Since
the value of the property when sold is therefore at issue, experts will be
called to assess that value. Some of the relevant factors may be highly
60. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977).
61. 1979 DTPA § 17.45(9) ("actual awareness of the act or practice constituting the
breach"). Such language is reminiscent of the state of mind required for an intentional tort.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 31 (4th ed. 1971).
62. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(b)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (im-
plied warranty of merchantability includes warranty that goods will conform to the promises
or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any); Id. § 2.312 (implied warranty
that the title conveyed shall be good and its transfer rightful).
63. See Ford Motor Co. v. Tidwell, 563 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso,
writ refd n.r.e.) (in suit for breach of an implied warranty, plaintiff must prove that goods
were defective at the time of sale).
64. See, e.g., Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78, 80 (Union County
Ct. 1970); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265 (1969).
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subjective and some highly technical. The seller's best defense may well
be that he is not an expert and was not aware of the specific facts that
allegedly created the price disparity; or, he may simply claim that, in good
faith, he evaluated the property differently from the expert. If the con-
sumer cannot prove the defendant's awareness of the bargain's unfairness,
he will be entitled only to actual damages.
Time ofRepresentations. Section 17.45(9) does not specify when the de-
ceptive act or practice must take place. If after the effective date of the
1979 amendments a seller unknowingly misrepresents the quality of a boat
at the time of sale, the consumer will not be entitled to treble damages. If,
on the other hand, the seller learns the falsity of his statement after the
initial meeting with the buyer when the statement was made but prior to
the closing of the transaction, the seller will be liable under section
17.46(b)(23) for failing to correct the misrepresentation.65 Furthermore,
the seller could be liable for the additional damages caused by post-sale
misrepresentations, if he is aware of their falsity at the time they are
made.66 Hence, awareness of the falsity of a representation and awareness
of the unfair nature of a deceptive act need not coincide with the sale.
Such awareness may arise either before the sale or after it, as long as it is
coincident with an unlawful act or practice that is the producing cause of
the consumer's damage.
Conclusion. The various scienter elements engrafted on the DTPA by the
1979 amendments constitute a significant change in the Act. The new defi-
nition of "knowingly," coupled with the 1979 amendment allowing the
jury to award treble damages, provides a vehicle by which evidence of the
relative culpability of the defendant may be presented to the jury. The
1979 amendments have thus significantly reduced the harsh effect of auto-
matic trebling and given the jury a large measure of discretion in punish-
ing a defendant for knowing violations of the Act.
C. Section 17 46(a).: False, Misleading, or Deceptive Acts Declared
Unlawful and Made Subject to Enforcement by the Attorney
General's Office
Prior law simply declared unlawful any false, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices.67 The 1979 amendment to section 17.46(a) restates this
prohibition, 68 but expressly commits enforcement activities under this sec-
65. See notes 128-29 infra and accompanying text.
66. In Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), the Texas Supreme Court held
that deceptive acts or practices taking place after the cause of action arose will give rise to
liability. See also Lynn, Anatomy of a Deceptive Trade Practices Case, 31 Sw. L.J. 867, 877(1977
.
R 1977 DTPA § 17.46(a) provided: "False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
68. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(a) provides: "False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful and are subject to
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tion to the consumer protection division of the attorney general's office.69
The significance of this change is apparent only by reference to amended
section 17.46(d) and section 17.50(a)(1), which now limit private consumer
actions for false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices to the so-called
"laundry list" items enumerated in section 17.46(b). The consumer may
no longer sue for false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices that are
not specifically set forth in the laundry list. Following this change, the
authority to take action against unlisted deceptive acts or practices is
vested solely in the attorney general's office.7" Amended section 17.46(a)
makes express reference to the sections of the Act that describe the powers
and activities of the attorney general's office, specifically section 17.47 (re-
straining orders), section 17.58 (voluntary compliance), section 17.60 (re-
ports and examinations), and section 17.61 (civil investigative demand).
D. Section 17 46(b)(22)." Distant Forum Abuse7
Section 17.46(b)(22) proscribes filing suit against a consumer based on a
consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or credit extensions, pri-
marily for personal, family, household, or agricultural use, when the plain-
tiff knows or has reason to know that the consumer does not reside in the
county where the suit was brought or in the county where the contract was
signed.72 Prior to the 1979 amendments, section 17.46(b)(22), previously
numbered 17.46(b)(21), excepted from liability plaintiffs who initiated
suits against consumers when the consumer resided in a city with a popula-
tion of less than 250,000 if the suit was filed in the nearest county with a
population of 250,000 or more. The pre-amendment Act further excepted
suits filed pursuant to the multi-party provisions provided by Texas venue
laws.7 3 The 1979 amendments delete those two exceptions. Therefore, af-
action by the consumer protection division under Sections 17.47, 17.58, 17.60, and 17.61 of
this code."
69. The "consumer protection division" is defined to mean "the antitrust and consumer
protection division of the attorney general's office." 1977 DTPA § 17.45(8).
70. The change in this section would not appear to affect the authority of a district or
county attorney to seek injunctive relief for false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices
under § 17.48(b), as long as written notice is given to the attorney general's office.
71. For a description of distant forum abuse, see Vargas v. Allied Fin. Co., 545 S.W.2d
231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Samson, Distant Forum
Abuse in Consumer Transactions, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 269 (1973).
72. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(b)(22) provides that deceptive practices include:
filing suit founded upon a written contractual obligation of and signed by the
defendant to pay money arising out of or based on a consumer transaction for
goods, services, loans, or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal,
family, household, or agricultural use in any county other than in the county
in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action
or in the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract; provided,
however, that a violation of this subsection shall not occur where it is shown
by the person filing such suit he neither knew or had reason to know that the
county in which such suit was filed was neither the county in which the de-
fendant resides at the commencement of the suit nor the county in which the
defendant in fact signed the contract.




ter the effective date of the amendments, any suit described by new section
17.46(b)(22) is per se a deceptive act or practice.
Since there are no reported cases construing section 17.46(b)(22) as it
existed between 1977 and 1979,74 and since there is no legislative history to
suggest why the exceptions to subsection (22) were deleted, it is difficult to
ascertain the purpose behind the amendment.
As presently worded, subsection (22) raises at least one interesting issue:
Is it a deceptive trade practice to file suit outside the county where the
consumer resides or where the contract was signed, if the suit is filed in
federal court? In other words, if venue is proper in federal court in a par-
ticular district, is it a deceptive trade practice to bring suit in that court?
Although no case, either federal or state, has confronted the issue yet, it
appears that the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
should prevail over the DTPA as it would over any statute or order
preventing or punishing free access to the federal courts.75
E. Section 17 46(b) (23)." Failure to Disclose Information that Would
Alter the Consumer's Decision to Buy
Section 17.46(b)(23) is one of the most significant and far reaching
amendments of the 1979 Act. According to this provision, the knowing
failure to disclose information that would have altered the consumer's de-
cision to buy constitutes a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice
under the Act. Specifically, the amendment declares unlawful "the failure
to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at
the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was
intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed."76 As
a result of this amendment, defendant-sellers may now be liable for treble
damages under section 17.50(b)(1) because of their knowing omissions.
Under the old Act, the extent of a defendant's liability for omissions in
the sale of goods and services was unclear. Prior to the recent amend-
ments, several courts had indicated that the simple nondisclosure of infor-
mation did not give rise to liability under the Act.7 7 In certain
circumstances, however, nondisclosure of information may have been a
violation of section 17.46(a) even under the old Act. It seems likely, for
example, that liability under the 1977 Act could be predicated upon half-
truths or failure to disclose information necessary to prevent other state-
ments from being misleading since such conduct constitutes common law
74. In O'Shea v. International Business Machs. Corp., 578 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.), the court found 1977 DTPA § 17.46(b)(21)
inapplicable because the event occurred prior to the 1977 amendments.
75. See, e.g., Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Arnold, State Power to
Enjoin Federa Court Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 59 (1965).
76. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(b)(23).
77. Avery v. Maremont Corp., No. S-75-91-CA (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 1978) (unpublished
opinion); Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 641, 643 (N.D. Tex. 1976), modi-
fied, 567 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978).
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fraud 78 and is a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 79 Liabil-
ity for nondisclosure also exists at common law, and therefore arguably
under the pre-1979 DTPA, if the parties stand in a confidential or fiduciary
relationship to one another8" or if new facts are discovered that make a
prior statement untrue or misleading.8' Finally, a cause of action for fraud
may be based upon the nondisclosure of a material fact known by one
party to the transaction if he is aware that the other party is acting under a
misapprehension of the true facts82 or if the true facts known by one party
are not readily discoverable by the other party through the exercise of or-
dinary care and diligence.83 These examples of common law fraud may be
violations of the 1977 DTPA also.84 On the other hand, where there is no
78. Peerless Mills, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 527 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1975);
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 168, 175 (D.D.C. 1978); International Sec.
Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 475 S.W.2d 363, 369-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 496 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529
(1977).
79. Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 954 (2d Cir. 1960); P. Lorillard Co.
v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950); Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
80. Murphy v. Cartwright, 202 F.2d 71, 73-74 (5th Cir. 1953); Hayter v. Hudgens, 236
S.W. 232, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551 (1977).
81. Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184-
89 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Susanoil, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 519 S.W.2d 230, 236 n.6 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1967, writ ref d n.r.e); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
82. Chandler v. Butler, 284 S.W.2d 388, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, no
writ); Bullock v. Crutcher, 180 S.W. 940, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-T-exarkana 1941, no writ);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 61, § 106.
83. Clausner v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941); Griffith v. Byers
Constr. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 212 Kan. 65, 510 P.2d 198 (1973); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64
N.J. 445, 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Smith v. NRC Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1979); Moore &
Moore Drilling Co. v. White, 345 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Bullock v. Crutcher, 180 S.W. 940, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, no writ);
Elliott v. Clark, 157 S.W. 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913, no writ); Obde v. Schlemeyer,
56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash. App. 220, 491 P.2d 1312
(1971). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977); Keeton, Rights of
Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1953).
84. The obligation to disclose material facts that are not readily discoverable by the
other party through the exercise of ordinary care and diligence is still an evolving concept
under the common law and should therefore be applied cautiously in DTPA cases arising
under the old act. Most of the cases to date in this area involve the nondisclosure of facts so
"basic to the transaction" that their nondisclosure amounts to "a form of swindling, in which
the plaintiff is led by appearances into a bargain that is a trap." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551, Comment 1 (1977). The cases usually involve such things as the sale of houses
that are riddled with termites or constructed over a landfill, or the sale of animals that are
diseased. See note 83 supra. In the formulation of the rule adopted by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the disclosure obligation runs only to "facts basic to the transaction."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 55 1(e) (1977). But see Keeton, supra note 83, at 6.
This is a more rigorous and limited concept than "material" facts. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 551, Comment j (1977). A fact is basic to the transaction if it goes to the
essence of the transaction and is "an important part of the substance of what is bargained for
or dealt with." Id. Material facts, on the other hand, are facts that are "important and
persuasive inducements to enter into the transaction, but [do] not go to its essence." Id.
Another reason for caution in applying these authorities to pre-1979 DTPA cases is the
harshness of the sanctions available under the act. Many of the common law disclosure
cases are rescission cases, although a few involve claims for actual damages. See note 83
supra. These cases, however, seem to be based on evolving concepts of fairness to the buyer
rather than on the need to punish or deter the seller. See Keeton, supra note 83, at 6. Fur-
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duty to speak under either the common law85 or the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,86 there is apparently no duty of affirmative disclosure under
the old DTPA.87 The addition of subsection (23) to the laundry list of
deceptive acts or practices thus substantially broadens disclosure obliga-
tions under the Act.
The impetus for adopting subsection (23) was apparently the proposed
abolition of private consumer actions under section 17.46(a). Senator
Meier's bill, S.B. 357, limited consumer actions to the specific laundry list
items enumerated in section 17.46(b) of the 1977 Act so that a consumer
whose grievance did not fall within the laundry list had to resort to com-
mon law remedies, to other statutes, such as article 27.01 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code, 8 or to enforcement action by the attorney
general's office under the DTPA. Consumer forces within the senate re-
acted to Senator Meier's amendment by proposing an addition to the laun-
dry list that prohibited the failure to disclose a past or existing material
fact.89 Its proponents argued that passage of the amendment was neces-
sary to provide the consumer with a remedy for cases in which deception
was accomplished through nondisclosure. To illustrate this problem, legis-
lators were asked to imagine the plight of a consumer who buys a home
constructed over a nuclear waste disposal site or landfill and is not told of
these facts.9° Proponents of the disclosure amendment argued that S.B.
thermore, because this is an evolving area of the law and the line between the right to re-
main silent and the duty to speak is frequently unclear, see W. PROSSER, supra note 61,
§ 106, imposition of punitive damages may be inappropriate. Accordingly, since the courts
have no discretion in imposing treble damages under the pre-1979 DTPA, see Woods v.
Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 668-69 (Tex. 1977), liability for nondisclosure under the 1977 Act
should be limited to the type of situations that already call for affirmative disclosure under
the common law or correction of half truths under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Cf.
Avery v. Maremont Corp., No. S-75-91-CA (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 1978) ("where the legislature
has not more plainly pointed the way, this Court is reluctant to find in the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act a duty to warn that far exceeds the current scheme of liability for prod-
uct failure and product misrepresentation"). For an example of a DTPA case in which
liability under the old act for nondisclosure might have been appropriate, see Yates v.
Medrano, 580 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
85. See ABC Packard, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.2d 63, 67-69 (9th Cir. 1960);
Papile v. Robinson, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 307, 231 A.2d 91, 94 (1967).
86. See Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950); G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN,
THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 9.03(2)(a) (1979); Anderson & Winer, Corrective Advertising:
The FTC'S New Formulafor Effective Relief, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 312, 320 (1972).
87. See note 77 supra. It has been suggested that "an advertisement should set forth
whatever the purchaser would normally want to know about the nature and use of the prod-
uct," E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 105 (1971), and that
there is a duty to disclose all information required to make an "informed choice." Morse, A
Consumer's View of FTC Regulation of Advertising, 17 U. KAN. L. REV, 639, 640 (1969).
These are undoubtedly worthy goals although not necessarily workable ones. It seems
doubtful that the present state of the law reaches so far. See note 86 supra. Certainly, this is
not a proper standard for the imposition of treble damages under the DTPA, particularly
prior to the 1979 amendments. But see TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 3.04,
at 77 & n.31.
88. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968). See Comment, supra note
42, at 716-20.
89. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 5.
90. Id. Other examples cited to illustrate the need for a disclosure requirement in-
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357 would completely eliminate the duty to disclose in such a situation.9'
This example of a buyer who is not told that the house he has purchased
was constructed over a landfill or nuclear waste disposal site presents a
classic case of common law fraud for which the buyer has a clear cause of
action.92 Therefore, even if S.B. 357 would have prevented a private con-
sumer action for nondisclosure under the DTPA, the consumer would
have had a remedy for nondisclosure of basic facts at common law. Fur-
thermore, a DTPA suit on the consumer's behalf could have been main-
tained by the attorney general's office to recover actual damages or
restoration of property.93 Under the circumstances, the practical effect of
adding subsection (23) to the Act was not, as its supporters argued, to pro-
vide the consumer with a means of redress where no remedy would other-
wise have existed, but to insure that nondisclosures would be punished as
severely as affirmative misrepresentations, i e., by awards of treble dam-
ages and attorneys' fees. Such sanctions for nondisclosures arguably
would not have been available if the Act had been amended without the
addition of subsection (23). Whether treble damages and attorneys' fees
are appropriate sanctions for nondisclosure is a question that apparently
was never addressed by the legislature. Since treble damages under the
Act were initially justified as a needed incentive for consumer actions in-
volving small claims that could not otherwise be brought,94 the example of
a defrauded home buyer whose home is built over a nuclear waste disposal
site or landfill and whose claim is likely to be in the tens of thousands of
dollars, while of considerable emotional appeal, is not really responsive to
the issue.
Moreover, the legislature apparently failed to consider carefully the po-
tential scope of subsection (23). The example of a buyer who discovers
that his house was built over a nuclear waste disposal site or landfill is a
persuasive argument for a remedy precisely because the fact concealed is
basic to the transaction. Such a fact must be disclosed even under the
common law.95 If subsection (23) were limited to the disclosure of facts
"basic to the transaction," 96 or if it were so construed by the courts, it
cluded a house infested with termites, id. at 10- 11, and a car with a transmission that failed
after being driven around the block, id. at 12.
91. Id. at 5-6.
92. Westwood Dev. Co. v. Esponge, 342 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1961, writ refd n.r.e.). Cf. Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941)
(house built over landfill); Griffith v. Byer Constr. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 212 Kan. 65, 5 10 P.2d
198 (1973) (saline condition of soil); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash. App. 220, 491 P.2d 1312
(1971) (house built over landfill). See also notes 82 & 83 supra and accompanying text.
93. 1977 DTPA § 17.47(d) provides that in an action instituted by the state under
§ 17.47 the court may award actual damages to compensate identifiable persons who were
injured as a result of the unlawful practice. See Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 358
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
94. Hill, supra note 5, at 614.
95. See Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941); Griffith v. Byers
Constr. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 212 Kan. 65, 510 P.2d 198 (1973); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.
App. 220, 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551, Comment j, at 123 (1977). See also
discussion at note 84 supra. Arguably, the requirement that the consumer would not have
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reasonably might be viewed as a necessary and proper addition to the
laundry list, an addition that merely restored consumer rights that proba-
bly existed under section 17.46(a) prior to the 1979 amendments.97 The
provision, however, may also be susceptible of a much broader and more
open-ended application than its proponents realized or intended.
The best way to discuss the possible interpretations of the new subsec-
tion is to analyze each of the component elements of the subsection. A
seller or other participant in a transaction is guilty of a false, misleading, or
deceptive act or practice if five conditions are met:
(1) There is a failure to disclose,
(2) information concerning goods or services,
(3) known at the time of th&e transaction,
(4) intended to induce the consumer to enter into a transaction, and
(5) the consumer would not have entered into the transaction had
the information been disclosed.
(1) A Failure to Disclose. The term "failure to disclose" is not defined
under the amended Act,98 and although precise formulation of the DTPA
disclosure requirement must await further judicial development, some of
the problems that are likely to arise can be anticipated. One of the ques-
tions that almost certainly will be asked is whether subsection (23) requires
disclosure of information that is open and obvious to the consumer from
an examination of the product itself. Suppose, for example, that several
days after his purchase, the buyer of an automobile notices small indenta-
tions in the hood and some paint overspray on one of the car's quarter
panels. 99 Can the consumer revoke acceptance of the automobile or sue
for treble damages on the ground that the seller did not disclose these im-
perfections, even though the buyer had an opportunity to inspect the vehi-
cle before purchase? Under the pre-amendment Act, the consumer was
not entitled to rescission since the matters complained of did not substan-
entered the transaction had the information been revealed to him limits disclosure to "basic
facts." See notes 137-59 infra and accompanying text.
97. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
98. It is not surprising that the term is not defined since the conceptual difficulty in-
volved has discouraged definitional efforts in other laws. The term "disclosure" is not de-
fined, for example, by rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978), which imposes disclosure
obligations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. One commentator has sug-
gested that "full disclosure" for purposes of rule lOb-5 might be defined "as proper dissemi-
nation of a statement which conveys the true state of affairs to a reasonable investor." A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, § 64.04, at 3-230 (1979).
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976), prohibits the disclosure of informa-
tion by agencies of the federal government unless the disclosure is pursuant to the proce-
dures or exceptions created by the Privacy Act. The term "disclosure" is not defined in the
Act. See Harper v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 192, 197 (D.S.C. 1976), where the court
suggested that "the term be taken to denote the imparting of information which in itself has
meaning and which was previously unknown to the person to whom it is imparted."
Disclosure is also not defined under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e
(1976). See id. §§ 1602. See also Frank v. Reserve Consumer Discount Co., 398 F. Supp.
703, 704 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
99. Cf Freeman Oldsmobile Mazda Co. v. Pinson, 580 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (consumer brought action under the pre-amendment DTPA
on these facts and was denied rescission).
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tially impair the value of the automobile."i This resolution concerned the
availability of a particular remedy, however, rather than the existence of a
violation. Assuming that the seller is willing to correct the defects and that
no claim for breach of warranty would prevail, could a consumer suing
under the amended Act insist on his right to treble damages under a theory
of nondisclosure?
Under the common law there is no duty to disclose material facts that
are equally available to both buyer and seller.'' Even under the federal
securities laws, there is often no duty to disclose facts about which the
investor is presumably aware.' 0 2 In many cases, there is no obligation
under the federal securities laws to disclose information to which the buyer
already has access.'0 3 It is arguable, of course, that these precedents
should not control a defendant's disclosure obligation under the DTPA. It
may be argued plausibly that subsection (23) was intended to reach be-
yond the common law and to impose strict liability for nondisclosure of
material facts known to the defendant in all situations, including those in
which undisclosed information is readily available to the consumer. The
securities cases may be distinguished on the ground that purchasers of se-
curities have been held to have a duty of reasonable diligence or due
care, 104 while it is not yet clear whether any similar duty exists under the
DTPA.' °5
100. Id. at 114.
101. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 824 (E.D. Wis. 1962), af'd, 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); Moore & Moore Drilling Co. v. White, 345 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1961, writ reftd n.r.e.); Long v. Martin, 234 S.W. 91, 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1921, writ dism'd w.o.j.). See also note 106 infra and accompanying text. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551, Comment k (1977) states:
When the facts are patent, or when the plaintiff has equal opportunity for
obtaining information that he may be expected to utilize if he cares to do so,
or when the defendant has no reason to think that the plaintiff is acting under
a misapprehension, there is no obligation to give aid to a bargaining antago-
nist by disclosing what the defendant has himself discovered.
102. See Spielman v. General Host Corp., 538 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Johnson v.
Wiggs, 443 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendant who had been charged with a § 10b
violation, "was not required to say that which had been publicly proclaimed in several ways
on several occasions"); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (in the con-
text of a § 10b action under the Securities Exchange Act, the court held that "[sluch a stan-
dard requires the insider to exercise reasonable and due diligence not only in ascertaining
what is material as of the time of the transaction but in disclosing fully those material facts
about which the outsider is presumab y uninformed and which would, in reasonable anticipa-
tion, affect his judgment" (emphasis added)).
103. See, e.g., Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977); Hafner v. Forest Labo-
ratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1965).
104. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607,
623 (5th Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514,
517, 521 (10th Cir. 1973); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103-04 (5th
Cir. 1970); A. JACOBS, supra note 98, § 64.01(b), at 3-206 n.70.
105. The due diligence defense in Texas is narrow. When one has been induced into a
contract by fraudulent representations, the person committing the fraud cannot defeat a
claim for damages based upon a plea that the party defrauded might have discovered the
truth by the exercise of proper care. Isenhower v. Bell, 365 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1963). On
the other hand, the party claiming fraud may not shut his eyes and ears to matters equally
open and available to him upon reasonable inquiry and investigation. Moore & Moore
Drilling Co. v. White, 345 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ refd n.r.e.).
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On the other hand, there are several important reasons for believing that
defendants should not be held liable under the amended Act for failing to
disclose information that is as readily available to the buyer as to the
seller. First, the standard of disclosure in equal access circumstances need
not be the same as when information is more readily available to the seller.
When the buyer is given rights of inspection, for example, arguably the
seller's disclosure obligation should not extend to defects plainly visible
during inspection.' 6 Furthermore, the Act does not require disclosures to
be verbal. Affording the buyer a full opportunity to inspect the property is,
in fact, a disclosure of open and obvious defects. As the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit stated in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration:
[I]t is not necessarily true that the strict standards of disclosure which
appropriately apply to transactions in which there is a dramatic dis-
parity in the parties' access to material information will automatically
and totally apply to negotiated transactions in which the parties typi-
cally rely on contract warranties and pre-closing inspections or audits
as a basis for the investment decision. A flexible statute which em-
phasizes the relevance of the context in which a transaction takes
place should neither limit its protection to an arbitrarily defined class
of purchasers and sellers, nor arbitrarily assume that every purchaser
and every seller is entitled to precisely the same disclosure. 
°7
The defendant who has afforded a consumer full rights of inspection, or
who has otherwise widely disseminated information to the public, should
be held to have satisfied his disclosure obligations under subsection (23)
because, absent special circumstances to the contrary, he apparently did
not intend "to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed." 0 ' In
short, a defendant who is sued for failing to disclose information that is
already public or readily observable from an inspection that has in fact
occurred, should be able to defend, not only on the ground that disclosure
has in fact been made, but also on the ground that any alleged inadequacy
in the disclosure was the result of a good faith belief that the consumer
already had the information and not the result of any intention to induce
See also Dallas Joint Stock Bank v. Harrison, 138 Tex. 84, 156 S.W.2d 963 (1941); Rodgers
v. Insurance Co., 513 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.).
The party claiming fraud is chargeable with knowledge of all facts that could have been
discovered by a reasonably prudent person similarly situated. Thigpen v. Locke, 363
S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. 1962). low these rules will be applied under the DTPA which, ac-
cording to the Texas Supreme Court is designed for the protection of the "ignorant, the
unthinking and the credulous," Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 563, 564 (Tex. 1978),
has yet to be determined.
106. See M.L. Mayfield Petroleum Corp. v. Kelly, 450 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref d n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 547 (1977); cf.
Wege v. Harris, 420 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ) (statements
concerning age of cows not an express warranty where buyer inspected cattle three times
before making purchase). See a/so Ferguson v. Johnson, 205 S.W. 512, 514 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1918, no writ); Gorham v. Dallas, C. & S.W. Ry., 106 S.W. 930, 934 (Tex.
Civ. App.-1908, writ ref d n.r.e.).
107. 490 F.2d 654, 660 n.28 (7th Cir. 1973).
108. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(b)(23).
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the consumer to enter into a transaction into which he otherwise would not
have entered.
Apart from determining what information must be disclosed, the courts
must decide to whom disclosures must be made.'0 9 This determination
requires answering a number of related questions. For example, will the
disclosure obligation extend only to the immediate consumer, or will it
also extend to subsequent consumers who may purchase the goods second-
hand?l"1 Will disclosure to agents or experts retained by the consumer be
sufficient (disclosures to physicians in the sale of prescription drugs, for
example), or must disclosure be made to the consumer himself?". Will
intermediate vendors or middlemen be entitled to disclosure?" 12
Secondly, how will such disclosures be implemented? Will it be suffi-
cient to publicize such disclosures in the media, or will direct communica-
tion with the consumer be necessary? Will labels be adequate, 1 3 or must
special disclosure books or propectuses be delivered to the consumer or
kept in stores and updated periodically?' 1"' Additionally, how specific
must disclosures be in order to be adequate? Will it be sufficient to dis-
close that a product may be hazardous to a user's health or will it also be
necessary to describe in detail the specific danger?
Finally, will the required disclosure vary with the seller's sophistication?
109. See Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co., 212 Kan. 65, 510 P.2d 198, 204-05 (1973) (holding
lack of privity between homeowner and developer no bar to claim for fraudulent nondisclo-
sure). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 61, § 107, at 702; Keeton, TheAmbit of a Fraudulent
Representor's Responsibility, 17 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1938).
110. See Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank, 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 300 P.2d 14,
16-17 (1956), in which the court stated that a vendor owes the duty of disclosure to a third
party if the vendor intended that the third party rely on material representations made by
the vendor.
11. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (warnings
to physicians held insufficient where drug dispensed at mass clinics put manufacturer on
notice that warnings were not reaching the consumer).
112. See Person v. Latham, 582 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.).
113. See W. PROSSER, supra note 61, § 96, at 647, which states:
The warning must be sufficient to protect third persons who may reasonably
be expected to come in contact with the product and be harmed by it; and
where it is not practical to reach all such people, the seller must do what is
reasonable in the way of labels, literature to be distributed, or warnings to
those who can be expected to pass them on.
114. Senator Meier objected to a proposed amendment to the DTPA in the senate that
was substantially similar to subsection (23) as finally adopted. One of the grounds for his
opposition was fear of the considerable burden he believed the disclosure requirement
would impose on commerce. Among other things, he speculated that such a requirement
would impose on the seller the burden of preparing a prospectus or booklet in which to
make the necessary disclosures:
The danger in adopting an amendment of this type allows any disgruntled
purchaser to go back and barge through the entire negotiations as between the
buyer and the seller. And attempt to find and foist up some fact and convince
a court or jury that that fact was material to the transaction or sale, is that you
put a total burden upon sales and commerce, because every seller is going to
have to go and prepare a prospectus or a booklet or a document, and maybe a
brochure, Senator, trying to set out completely every conceivable fact that
could ever be dredged up, dug up-
Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 8-9.
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For example, will a less complete disclosure be required of the occasional
seller, such as a person selling his own home or holding a garage sale, than
will be required of a merchant?
Unfortunately, these are only a few of the many questions that remain to
be answered about the disclosure aspects of subsection (23). Considerable
judicial interpretation is therefore needed to make the disclosure obliga-
tion meaningful and to establish its boundaries.
(2) Information Concerning Goods or Services. The second element of
the disclosure obligation under the 1979 DTPA is the requirement that the
disclosure relate to "information concerning goods or services." There is
probably little question that information concerning defects in goods or
services comes within this formulation. The disclosure obligation, how-
ever, may not be limited to disclosure of nonconformities or defects in the
goods or services themselves. Since the term "concerning" is imprecise
and relative, and since there are many ways in which information can con-
cern goods or services, the judicial interpretation given this provision will
have a profound impact on the scope of subsection (23).
Consider, for example, the following facts. The purchaser of a computer
claims that he was not told of the manufacturer's financial problems when
he made his purchase. He claims that he would not have bought the com-
pany's product had he known of such problems since the company's
financial collapse would make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to ob-
tain parts and service. The purchaser sues, claiming nondisclosure of in-
formation under subsection (23) that "concerns" the product he purchased.
Is the company's financial situation at the time of the consumer's transac-
tion "information concerning goods or services"?
The consumer probably would argue that subsection (23) requires such
information to be disclosed because the financial viability of the company
is inextricably intertwined with the value of the product. On the other
hand, the defendant would argue that such information need not be dis-
closed because it is information concerning the company as a whole rather
than information concerning the goods or services themselves. No defini-
tive resolution of these conflicting viewpoints is possible at this time. One
practical effect of requiring the disclosure of complete financial informa-
tion each time a sale is made, however, would be the imposition on sellers
of substantial disclosure costs that could significantly increase the costs of
a product or service, a cost that small businesses might be wholly unable to
afford.
Another difficult question involves the duty, if any, to disclose quality
control information concerning a particular product. Suppose that a com-
pany's internal quality control reports showed that twenty percent of the
products manufactured were defective and that an estimated five percent
of these defective products were ultimately sold. Is the manufacturer
under an obligation to furnish this information to buyers of its products?
Is this quality control data "information concerning goods or services," or
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is it more properly characterized as information concerning the manufac-
turing process itself? In some instances information of this type would be
profoundly helpful to consumers in choosing among competing products.
Is any seller who knowingly fails to furnish consumers with quality control
information in his possession, particularly of a negative character, there-
fore liable for treble damages under the Act? Once again the answer is
unclear, but the wording of subsection (23) does not clearly rule out the
possibility that such information might have to be disclosed.
Three additional examples further illustrate the uncertain scope of the
new amendments. The first concerns information about generic substi-
tutes. Would the failure to disclose that the seller's product contains the
same ingredients as lower priced generic substitutes constitute a failure to
disclose information "concerning goods or services"? Information con-
cerning the availability of such substitutes may in fact be material infor-
mation in that it could alter a reasonable consumer's purchasing decision
and might induce him not to buy the seller's product. Furthermore, such
information is arguably information concerning goods, although the infor-
mation does not concern the seller's goods as much as it does someone
else's. Does subsection (23) require such information to be disclosed? The
answer will probably depend on whether the courts limit the seller's disclo-
sure obligation to information about the goods or services that are the sub-
ject of the transaction in suit, or whether the disclosure obligation also
extends to information about other goods or services that might help the
consumer to decide whether to buy the particular product or service at
issue in the case. Only the first approach effectively limits the seller's dis-
closure obligation to information concerning his own goods or services.
The second example concerns information about model discontinuance.
Suppose a manufacturer is planning a major change in the composition of
his product and knows he will be phasing out the particular model that is
currently being sold. Does the manufacturer have an obligation under
subsection (23) to disclose these intentions to the consumer, who might
decide to wait for the new and presumably improved product if he knew of
the manufacturer's plans? Arguably, the information concerning model
discontinuance concerns the goods being sold. Does subsection (23) re-
quire such information to be disclosed even though premature disclosure
of the manufacturer's plans might harm his competitive position in the
marketplace?" 5
Finally, if real estate is involved, is the information to be disclosed lim-
ited to the condition of the premises for sale, or would it also include infor-
mation about the adequacy or purity of the water supply, the quality of
115. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), in which the court of appeals stated that under the federal securities laws the timing
of a disclosure was a matter for the business judgment of corporate executives in circum-
stances where a valuable corporate purpose would be served by delaying the disclosure, so
long as the undisclosed information was not used to trade in the corporation's stock or selec-
tively furnished to outsiders.
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nearby schools, the availability of bus service, and the character of the
neighborhood?
Whatever the answers to these questions, it is clear that subsection (23)
will pose difficult interpretive problems for the courts and that the phrase
"information concerning goods or services" is likely to be of critical impor-
tance in avoiding unrealistic and unworkable applications of the Act. The
courts must eventually decide whether the information required to be dis-
closed by the Act is limited in some fashion, perhaps to information that
directly describes the performance, characteristics, or dangers of the prod-
uct or service itself, or whether the duty to disclose also extends to collat-
eral matters such as the manner in which the product is made, or to
similarities between the seller's products or services and the products or
services of other vendors." 16 It is suggested that a rather close nexus
should be required between the undisclosed information and the particular
goods or services at issue in the suit.
(3) Known at the Time of the Transaction. The requirement that the in-
formation to be disclosed be "known at the time of the transaction" fol-
lows the common law rule that disclosure is required when the true facts
known to one party are not readily discoverable by the other party."
7
This rule appears to be based upon the defendant's actual knowledge of
the undisclosed fact" 8 and in this respect imposes a scienter requirement
similar to an action for fraudulent concealment.1 9 Subsection (23) there-
fore requires actual knowledge rather than merely constructive
knowledge.' 2 ° It does not, however, impose on the defendant a duty to
116. In arriving at a workable interpretation of the phrase "concerning goods or serv-
ices," the courts may look to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 2.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968), which states, inter alia, that express warranties are created by any affirmation of fact
"which relates to the goods." Courts in other jurisdictions have held that an express war-
ranty relating to goods involves statements or representations that have reference to the
character, quality, or title of goods. See Atlanta Tallow Co. v. John W. Eshelman & Sons,
110 Ga. App. 737, 140 S.E.2d 118, 126 (1964); Vasco Trucking, Inc. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 6
Ill. App. 3d 572, 286 N.E.2d 383, 386 (1972). The Texas courts have described a material
representation as one "that relates to the condition, kind, and quality of the property". Put-
nam v. Bromwell, 73 Tex. 465, 467, 11 S.W. 491, 492 (1889).
117. See cases cited at note 83 supra and accompanying text.
118. Moore & Moore Drilling Co. v. White, 345 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las 1961, writ refd n.r.e.) ("[a]ctionable fraud has certain fundamental characteristics; (1)
there must be a misrepresentation as to material facts . . . or failure to disclose facts within
the knowledge of the parties sought to be charged" (emphasis added)); Bullock v. Crutcher,
180 S.W. 940, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkanna 1915, no writ) ("each party to a contract-
'is bound in every case to communicate to the other his knowledge of materialfacts, provided
he knows the other to be ignorant of them and they be not open and naked or equally within
the reach of his observation'" (emphasis added)).
119. Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 148, 157 S.W.2d 878, 879 (1942) (fraudulent con-
cealment includes actual knowledge that a wrong has occurred). In an action for fraudulent
concealment, one cannot be guilty of fraudulently or intentionally concealing facts of which
he is unaware. Raney v. Mack, 504 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no
writ); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Daniel Motor Co., 149 S.W.2d 979, 989-90 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 194 1, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (defendant's liability not established by evi-
dence tending to show knowledge on the part of defendant's bookkeeper-employee).
120. See Teodonna v. .Bachman, 404 P.2d 284, 286 (Colo. 1965); Miles v. Love, 1 Kan.
App. 2d 630, 573 P.2d 622, 625 (1977); Alexander v. Johnson Furnace Co., 543 S.W.2d 539,
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investigate or to discover facts not actually known to him. 2' On the other
hand, neither does the Act require a specific intent to defraud' 22 or knowl-
edge of the incorrect impression produced by the statements or omissions
made.2 3 Subsection (23) simply requires that the defendant have actual
knowledge of the existence of the undisclosed information.2 4
This standard appears to be slightly less demanding than the "know-
ingly" standard defined in section 17.43(9) as "actual awareness of the fal-
sity, deception or unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the
consumer's claim."' 2 5 Since treble damages are recoverable under section
17.50(b)(1) only if the defendant's conduct was "committed knowingly," 1'26
it will probably be necessary to submit more than one scienter issue to the
jury in a suit based upon a failure to disclose when the plaintiff is seeking
treble damages.
One of the issues that eventually must be resolved under subsection (23)
is the extent to which knowledge of an agent or employee can be imputed
to his principal. The Texas Supreme Court's recent holding in Royal Globe
Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 27 which found the principal liable
for the deceptive acts or practices of his agent, may not be controlling
when liability depends on a finding of knowledge or scienter. No such
finding was necessary to liability in the Royal Globe case. Courts have
traditionally been reluctant to impute actual knowledge of wrongdoing by
an agent to his principal, particularly in cases involving punitive dam-
ages.' 28
542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544, 547(Sup. Ct. 1965). But see Weikel v. Sterns, 142 Ky. 513, 514, 134 S.W. 908, 909 (1911). A
defendant might be deemed to have constructive knowledge of a fact if he could have
learned it with due diligence. See A. JACOBS, supra note 98, § 63, at 3-180.19.
121. Senator Clower in sponsoring an amendment to S.B. 357 that was the precursor to
subsection (23), stated:
[It] does not impose any duty on any seller in the State of Texas to go out and
search up any facts that he does not know in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness, or that's common knowledge.
It simply must require him if he knows of these facts that he must disclose
them.
Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 5. This approach may be contrasted with the negli-
gence or recklessness standard, which does impose a duty to investigate. See Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 364 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d Cir. 1973); 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 98, § 63, at 3-108.18-.19.
122. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
123. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
124. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 256-57 (D. Md. 1971),
f'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 916 (1974).
125. 1979 DTPA § 17.43(9). This standard is closer to actual scienter in which the
speaker is conscious of wrongdoing. See Myzel v. Fields, 386. F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
126. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
127. 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979).
128. See Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Scurlock Oil Co., 447 F.2d 997, 1004-05 n.12 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 498-99 (5th Cir. 1966) (refusing to
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The courts must also deal with the aspect of subsection (23) that requires
that the defendant's knowledge exist "at the time of the transaction." The
term "transaction" is a word of flexible meaning that may comprehend a
series of many occurrences 129 and include events over a prolonged period
of time;' 3° therefore, subsection (23) appears to impose on the defendant a
continuing duty to disclose any information concerning the goods or serv-
ices that he learns prior to the actual consummation of the sale, regardless
of whether he had the information when negotiations first began.
(4) The Intention of Inducing the Consumer into a Transaction. The in-
tentional non-disclosure of facts for the purpose of inducing action by an-
other is fraudulent at common law. 3 1 Accordingly, the requirement in
subsection (23) that the defendant's failure to disclose information be "in-
tended to induce the consumer into a transaction" derives from the com-
mon law and is an important limitation on the scope of a defendant's
liability for non-disclosure under the Act. If a defendant can offer credible
reasons for his non-disclosure other than a desire to see the transaction
consummated, he may be able to avoid liability under subsection (23).
One possible application of this requirement has already been men-
tioned: If the defendant can demonstrate that the undisclosed facts were
open and obvious or had been widely publicized, he may legitimately con-
tend that he believed the buyer was already in possession of the informa-
tion in question and had no need for further disclosure. 132 Even if he was
wrong in his assessment of the buyer's knowledge, he can point to prior
disclosures or the granting of inspection rights as evidence that he had no
intention to induce the buyer into a transaction by his silence.
This intention requirement is also important in cases in which the de-
fendant had no pecuniary interest in the consummation of the transaction.
Consider, for example, the situation in which a prospective home buyer
impute knowledge to corporation under statute requiring knowledge or intent and imposing
punitive or exemplary damages where employee acting for his own and not employer's ben-
efit); Traylor v. Gray, 547 S.W.2d 644, 65 I(Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (a principal may not be bound where the agent performs unauthorized acts in conflict
with the interests of another). See also Snook v. Netherby, 124 Cal. App. 2d 797, 269 P.2d
195, 198 (1954) (refusing to impute knowledge of agent to principal where liability for dam-
ages required finding of bad faith); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627,
630 (Tex. 1967); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Daniel Motor Co., 149 S.W.2d 979, 989-90 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 194 1, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (refusing to impute knowledge of book-
keeper to cororate employer for purposes of establishing fraudulent nondisclosure); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 275 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909
(1977). Cf. United Postage Corp. v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, no writ) ("A party cannot be held to have ratified facts unknown to him.").
129. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
130. See Temple News Agency v. Want Ads, 573 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1978, no writ), where the transaction involved a continuous course of conduct between
the parties over an eight-month period.
131. Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. 1974);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 8 (1937). An intention that the nondisclosure be acted
upon is one of the elements of an action for fraudulent concealment. Teodonno v. Bach-
man, 404 P.2d 284, 285 (Colo. 1965).
132. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
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employs a home inspection service to examine a house and advise him as
to its condition. The inspection service makes its examination and collects
its standard fee, but fails to disclose to the buyer numerous defects that are
discovered after the buyer purchases the home. Buyer then sues the home
inspection service alleging, among other things, a violation of subsection
(23). In these circumstances, the home inspection service's primary de-
fense probably would be lack of knowledge, assuming that it simply failed
to discover the defects in question before the buyer purchased the house.
In addition, it could defend on the grounds that it was not motivated by a
pecuniary interest in the consummation of the transaction since its fee
would be the same whatever was disclosed in its report. Accordingly, its
failure to disclose information concerning the property probably was not
intended to induce the consumer to purchase its services.' 33
Contrast this situation with a case in which the defendant is a real estate
broker acting as agent for the seller. The broker has an obvious monetary
interest in making the sale since his commission depends upon it. Accord-
ingly, a broker's failure to disclose information to the consumer that was
known to the broker at the time of the transaction might well have been
"intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed."' 134 A
seller's broker would therefore appear to have a duty under subsection (23)
to disclose known defects in the property to the buyer even if (and particu-
larly if) such disclosure would be likely to prevent consummation of the
sale. 135 A similar duty exists, of course, between the buyer and his own
broker. 36
The "intention to induce" requirement may also be significant in cases
involving the failure to disclose facts that do not appear material under the
circumstances known to the seller, but that may be of considerable conse-
quence to a particular buyer. For example, a buyer might purchase a
house with the intention of making certain improvements, such as adding
a second story, only to discover that soil conditions around the house are
such that the improvements cannot be made or can only be made at con-
siderable extra expense. If such a buyer were to sue the seller under sub-
section (23) for failure to disclose these limitations, the seller might defend
on the grounds that without knowledge of the buyer's particular needs, he
could not have known that these facts would influence the decision to buy.
Accordingly, even though the information in question was known to the
seller, he could argue that his nondisclosure was not intended to induce a
transaction that otherwise would not have occurred.
133. The absence of a pecuniary interest in the consummation of the sale would not be
relevant, however, if the inspection service had made affirmative misrepresentations. See,
e.g., Spicer v. Great Serv., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ)
(misrepresentation of condition of air conditioning and heating system in connection with
home sale).
134. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(b)(23).
135. Such a duty may also have existed at common law. See Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220
Cal. App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963).
136. See Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107, 110 (Ct. App. 1976).
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(5) The Consumer Would Not Have Entered the Transaction Had the In-
formation Been Disclosed. This provision is essentially a materiality re-
quirement. Like other materiality requirements, it is designed to insure
"that a cause of action cannot be established by proof of a defect so trivial,
or so unrelated to the transaction . . . that correction of the defect or im-
position of liability would not further the interests protected."'' 37
In selecting a materiality requirement for subsection (23), the legislature
looked to the strict materiality standard for common law fraud actions, 138
and not to the more relaxed materiality requirements for affirmative con-
duct under the 1977 DTPA, 39 or to standards governing suits under the
federal securities laws, 'I the Federal Trade Commission Act,' 4 ' or other
federal statutes. 4 2 Subsection (23) imposes liability for a nondisclosure
only in circumstances where the trier of fact believes that the information
withheld would actually have altered or changed the consumer's decision
to buy. In short, the transaction must be one that the consumer "would
not have entered" if the information had been disclosed. This is precisely
the standard used in common law fraud cases.' 43 It is clearly different
from "the capacity to deceive" standard of Federal Trade Commission
cases144 and affirmative conduct cases under the 1977 DTPA, 45 from the
"capacity to influence" standard of federal bank loan cases, 146and from
the "substantial likelihood" and "significant propensity" standards of the
federal securities laws.
147
Given the multiplicity of materiality standards under federal law, it is
perhaps fortunate that subsection (23) was not adopted in the form in
which it was originally presented to the senate. In its initial form, the
amendment prohibited failure to disclose a known past or existing material
fact.' 48 After being defeated in the senate, 149 that amendment was exten-
137. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447 (1976).
138. See H.W. Broaddus Co. v. Binkley, 126 Tex. 374, 88 S.W.2d 1040 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1936, opinion adopted); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 1978, writ granted); Shepard v. Rubin, 462 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ); Connor v. Buckley, 380 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1964, no writ); ef RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977)
("would attach importance in making his choice"). See also Senate Floor Debate, supra
note 49, at 13. The Senate debate shows that the legislature had the common law definition
of "material" in mind when subsection (23) was under consideration. See note 150 infra.
139. See Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex. 1978); Bourland v. State,
528 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.); Wesware, Inc. v. State,
488 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ).
140. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976).
141. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 602 (9th Cir. 1957).
142. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976) (prohibiting the making of false statements to a
bank in order to obtain a loan); United States v. Braverman, 522 F.2d 218, 228 (7th Cir.
1975).
143. See note 138 supra.
144. See Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957).
145. See note 139 supra.
146. See United States v. Braverman, 522 F.2d 218, 228 (7th Cir. 1975).
147. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
148. See Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 5.
149. Id. at 14.
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sively revised, and in its final form the amendment fixes the standard of
materiality for nondisclosure cases' 5 ' by requiring that the consumer
would not have entered the transaction if the information had been dis-
closed. The amendment thus avoids the necessity for further judicial inter-
pretation that would have been required had the term "material fact" been
used.
One problem that may still need judicial clarification, however, is
whether materiality under subsection (23) is based on the objective stan-
dards of the hypothetical reasonable consumer or on the subjective values
of the individual plaintiff. Ordinarily, this would not be a difficult ques-
tion to answer since, as the United States Supreme Court has stated: "The
question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, involv-
ing the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable
investor."'' Nevertheless, subsection (23) uses the term "the consumer"
twice,' 52 as if referencing the particular consumer who is plaintiff in the
case, and the applicable Texas cases all discuss materiality in terms of the
plaintiff's conduct rather than the conduct of a hypothetical reasonable
purchaser. 153 The issue may therefore be submitted to the fact finder in
terms of the effect of the nondisclosure on the conduct of the particular
plaintiff rather than in terms of the effect of the nondisclosure on a reason-
able consumer.
The type of proof that will be required to show that the omitted infor-
mation would have altered the consumer's decision to purchase will, of
course, vary with the facts of each case. Courts have held, however, that
150. Adoption of a stricter materiality standard in nondisclosure cases than in cases in-
volving affirmative misrepresentations appears to result from a legislative concern for the
excessive burden that a less narrowly defined disclosure requirement would place on the
seller. Senator Meier had criticized the disclosure requirement as requiring the seller to
prepare a prospectus, booklet, or brochure in order to meet his disclosure obligations. Id. at
9. In responding to this criticism, Senator Clower emphasized the role of the materiality
requirement in limiting the seller's disclosure obligations:
Now, let's talk about what kind of facts we're talking about. I'm not talking
about a prospectus or a brochure about the facts about product for sale. I'm
not talking about any fact. In the Texas Digest there are compilation[s] of
cases that are indeterminately long that define what is a material fact.
And a material fact is, in plain English, a material fact ....
Id. at 13.
151. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
152. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(b)(23) (emphasis added).
153. See note 138 supra. It might be argued that subsection (23) contains a reliance
rather than a materiality requirement. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The courts, however, have generally moved away
from reliance and toward materiality in nondisclosure cases since it is difficult to prove reli-
ance on an omitted fact. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153
(1972) ("Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, posi-
tive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery."). Moreover, the Texas courts have
required proof that the transaction would not have been entered into but for the misrepre-
sentation (an issue described as involving materiality) even where reliance on the misrepre-
sentation was separately found. See Connor v. Buckley, 380 S.W.2d 722, 723-24 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1964, no writ). It would not appear necessary to determine whether reliance or
materiality is the more appropriate analogy, however, since the necessary factual determina-
tion can be made by the jury in terms of the language of the statute itself.
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materiality is determined at the time the alleged wrongful conduct oc-
curs.' Accordingly, subsequent events cannot make an omission mate-
rial that was unimportant when it occurred,'55 nor can they make an
important fact immaterial by showing that subsequent events rendered it
unimportant. 156
Arguably, limiting a seller's disclosure obligation to material facts, that
is, facts that would actually alter a consumer's decision to buy, sufficiently
defines the disclosure obligation to permit effective compliance with the
Act. "'57 In some situations this may be true. There will be many other
situations, however, in which the information concerning a product or
service will be so abundant that distinguishing the material from the im-
material facts will be more a matter of guesswork than judgment. The
materiality test is by no means easy to apply. Courts themselves have dis-
agreed about which facts were material in a given set of circumstances,
5 8
and lay jurors have been unable to apply the concept without detailed gui-
dance from a court.' 59 It is therefore likely that the average merchant will
also have difficulty in deciding what must be disclosed. Unfortunately,
this task will not be made any easier by the fact that subsection (23) trans-
fers this complex disclosure obligation into an environment (the depart-
ment store, for example) where literally tens of thousands of products are
on sale at any given time. Adequate disclosure in these circumstances may
prove nearly impossible to achieve.
Conclusions. This analysis of the legal components of a nondisclosure
claim suggests that there are numerous problems that the courts must re-
solve in administering claims under subsection (23). Moreover, in light of
existing common law protections, adding this provision may have been
unnecessary and undesirable. There is a serious possibility that subsection
(23) may have a substantially unsettling influence on the finality of trans-
actions, including those that are basically fair and without any genu-
inely injurious effects on the consumer. If, for example, consumers can
persuade courts that subsection (23) extends beyond the duty to disclose
basic defects in the product or service itself to such matters as generic sub-
stitution, model discontinuance, quality control data, and financial infor-
154. See City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir. 1970) (validity of
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation in stock purchase transaction is determined "in light
of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation").
155. See A. JACOBS, supra note 98, § 61.02[a], at 3-72.
156. See Sonesta Internat'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 254 (2d
Cir. 1973).
157. See, e.g., Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 13, quoted at note 150 supra.
158. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 451-64 (1976) (Supreme
Court reversing court of appeals' determination that nondisclosures were material as a mat-
ter of law).
159. See Shepard v. Rubin, 462 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ)
(jury foreman advising judge that jury unable to understand special issue without a defini-
tion of "material fact").
160. Senator Meier attempted to warn his colleagues that subsection (23) would have this
effect. See note 114 supra.
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mation, then few transactions are likely to be immune from challenge
under the DTPA.
Moreover, disclosure beyond a certain point may not be as beneficial to
the consumer as it is sometimes believed to be. A growing body of empiri-
cal evidence questions the impact of disclosures on consumer buying pat-
terns, 16 particularly among the poor. 16 2 Even if one assumes, however,
that disclosure will alter consumer buying habits, it is not entirely clear
that a disclosure provision like the one contained in the DTPA will alter
those habits for the better.
The information that must be disclosed in order to avoid liability under
subsection (23) is essentially negative in character. It is information that if
known would have discouraged the consumer from entering into the trans-
action. One possible danger of such a requirement is that the sellers who
most diligently comply with their disclosure obligations may be penalized
by having consumers turn away from their products to the products of
sellers whose disclosures are less complete and therefore less alarming.
There is no guarantee, however, that the products sold by the second group
of sellers will in fact be superior to those sold by the first group. Quite the
reverse may be true. In that event, the disclosure obligation will have
helped to induce consumers to purchase inferior products, an effect cer-
tainly not intended by the legislature.
Another potential problem is the cost of compliance to the seller and
thus indirectly to the consumer. There is no indication in the legislative
history of the amended Act that any attempt was made to obtain such
information before subsection (23) was adopted. Cost will vary, of course,
with the means as well as the degree of disclosure. Advertising is a rela-
tively expensive means of disclosure; 63 product labeling costs considera-
bly less. Product labeling, however, is less effective than advertising' 64 and
is likely to have increasingly less impact on the consumer as the labeling
becomes more extensive and complex.' 65 Subsection (23) provides the
seller with no guidance as to how his disclosure obligations under the Act
are to be discharged. The cost of disclosure is therefore likely to remain a
highly variable item with each seller and each type of product. Until the
cost is somehow measured and the indirect cost to the consumer deter-
mined, it must remain an article of faith that the benefits of such disclosure
outweigh the costs.
Unfortunately, the cost of subsection (23) is not limited to the cost of
attempted compliance. Litigation expenses and attorneys' fees are also
likely to be significant hidden cost items, particularly if compliance with
161. See Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions,
1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 403 & n.21.
162. See generally Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
163. Whitford, supra note 161, at 447.
164. Id. at 443-44. Whitford concludes, however, that there is insufficient information to
assess the full impact of product labeling disclosure. Id. at 444.
165. Id. at 443-44. As already noted, it is unclear whether these types of disclosures, as
opposed to direct communication with the consumer, will be adequate. See text accompa-
nying notes 109-14 supra.
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subsection (23) proves difficult to achieve. There is every indication that
compliance with subsection (23) will not be easy. The scienter require-
ment, which is quite high, may afford some measure of protection to the
seller once the litigation is started.'66 The problem is avoiding litigation
entirely, and that problem may prove to be a difficult one. For one thing,
subsection (23) is in some respects broader than the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws and the disclosure requirements of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.'67 The problem is further aggravated by the ab-
sence of any administrative rules or regulations describing a seller's disclo-
sure obligations under subsection (23). The securities laws provide those
engaged in securities transactions with detailed guidance as to the specific
information that must be disclosed in many types of transactions.' 68 The
same is true of truth-in-lending requirements. 169 Furthermore, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System are available to help parties and their lawyers achieve
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal laws in-
volved. 170 No comparable administrative guidelines or assistance is avail-
able to those who may wish to comply with subsection (23). Although the
attorney general's office has general enforcement responsibility for the Act,
its lawyers probably could offer little more than an educated guess as to
the application of subsection (23) in any particular instance since their
only guidance is the statute itself and possibily imperfect analogies to com-
mon law fraud or federal trade commission cases.
A final problem with subsection (23) is that it applies to the occasional
seller who is likely to be as unsophisticated as those who buy from him.
The person selling his own home, for example, or holding a garage sale is
subject to the disclosure requirements of subsection (23), yet most likely
will never understand how to comply with them or even know that they
exist. Furthermore, subsection (23) exposes these and other sellers to
treble damages, a sanction so harsh' 7 ' that it has not been thought neces-
sary as a punishment for nondisclosure of material facts even under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 172
166. See discussion at notes 117-36 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 86-87, 102-03 supra and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-.20 (1979) (Regulation S-K: information required in
registration statements); id. § 240.14a-101 (Schedule 14A: information required in proxy
statements); id. § 240.14d-100 (Schedule 14D-1: information required in tender offers).
169. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1503 (1979). Sections 226.1501-.1503 provide disclosure
forms for particular types of lease transactions.
170. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.81 (1979) (interpretive opinions and no-action letters from SEC
staff); 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d) (1979) (issuance of interpretations by staffof the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System).
171. The effects of this penalty could be as dramatic as those imagined in the example of
the homeowner who buys a house that was constructed over landfill (see notes 90-94 supra
and accompanying text); an individual selling his own home, for example, who unsuccess-
fully defends himself against a subsection (23) claim, could lose the entire equity that it had
taken him a lifetime to build and that he planned to use for retirement.
172. See Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 259-60 (4th Cir. 1975) (denial of punitive dam-
ages on ground that 1934 Securities Act prohibits recovery in excess of actual damages);
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1229-32 (10th Cir. 1970) (punitive damages
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It is hoped that the legislature will reevaluate subsection (23) in the next
legislative session. It sets an unrealistically high disclosure standard that
will be widely violated and, given time, is likely to generate an enormous
amount of litigation of questionable benefit to the consumer. The need for
subsection (23) should be carefully evaluated in light of existing remedies.
If retained at all, the disclosure obligation should be limited to known de-
fects in the product or service itself, to facts basic to the transaction, or to a
prohibition on half-truths. Furthermore, treble damages for nondisclo-
sures should either be abolished entirely, or an exemption or reduction in
penalties should be considered for the occasional seller. A provision that is
consistent with the realities of the marketplace is more likely to benefit
consumers than one that establishes unreachable goals.
F. Section 17 46(c): Judicial Construction of the DTPA
Prior to the 1979 amendments, section 17.46(c) provided that it was the
intent of the legislature that the courts be guided by the interpretations
given the Federal Trade Commission Act by federal courts in construing
section 17.46(a) in private consumer actions.7 3 The 1979 amendments
now expressly provide that the courts are not prohibited from considering
pertinent decisions of courts in other jurisdictions. 7 4 The 1979 modifica-
tion is an apparent attempt to free the courts from the necessity of follow-
ing interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act when those
interpretations would be inappropriate in the context of treble damage re-
covery. 1
7 5
This modification is particularly important given the almost uniform ad-
herence exhibited by Texas courts to interpretations of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. For example, in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Con-
inappropriate in rule 1Ob-5 action because securities laws already provide substantial deter-
rence, burden would ultimately fall on innocent stockholders, and possibility of recovery
exists for punitive damages in multiple actions based on same transaction). But c/ Young v.
Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1972) (claim for punitive damages allowed since
action was based on violation of Federal Securities Act and state law).
173. 1977 DTPA § 17.46(c) provides:
(1) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of this
section in suits brought under Section 17.47 of this subchapter the courts to the
extent possible will be guided by Subsection (b) of this section and the inter-
pretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and federal courts to Sec-
tion 5(a)(0) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.A. 45(a)(1)].
(2) ft is the intent of the legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of this
section in suits brought under Section 17.50 of this subchapter the courts to the
extent possible will be guided by Subsection (b) of this section and the inter-
pretations given by the federal courts to Section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act ....
174. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(c)(2) provides: "In construing this subchapter the court shall
not be prohibited from considering relevant and pertinent decisions of courts in other juris-
dictions." In explaining the purpose of this provision to his colleagues in the senate, Senator
Meier stated that it was his experience that the thread of reason. . .[was] sparked by even
such far away places as New York City." Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 21.
175. See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 66, at 872 n.33, for a criticism of the adoption of the
materiality standard used in FTC enforcement actions.
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sultants, inc.,176 the Texas Supreme Court held that an agent's lack of ac-
tual authority is not a defense to a claim for treble damages against his
principal if the agent was acting within the apparent scope of his authority.
Adopting the analysis contained in an FTC injunction case, the court rea-
soned that because the principal selected the agent to act in the venture, it
was fair to impose upon the principal the entire risk that the agent might
exceed his instructions. 177 The result reached by the supreme court was
not mandated by the DTPA and is arguably contrary to the court's own
prior decisions. 78 Before it was amended, section 17.46(c) provided that
the courts were to be guided by the Federal Trade Commission Act only
with regard to their interpretations of section 17.46(a), which broadly pros-
cribes all deceptive acts and practices. Section 17.46(c) never required the
court to look to the Federal Trade Commission Act when, as in Royal
Globe, the allegations concerned the enumerated proscriptions contained
in section 17.46(b). Moreover, the court in Royal Globe failed to discuss its
own decision in Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 17 9 which adopted
the Restatement position 80 clearly limiting a principal's liability for exem-
plary damages. Why treble damages should be awarded in the Royal
Globe context and punitive damages not awarded in essentially the same
fact situation under the common law was never explained by the court.
The mere recitation of FTC cases is not an adequate justification for an
entirely new rule in DTPA cases when the FTC cases cited as authority
concern government enforcement actions for injunctive relief and not
claims for punitive damages. 181
The 1979 amendment to section 17.46(c) should encourage courts to
search for the most appropriate legal precedent without regard for its
source and thereby improve the quality of decision-making under the Act.
No longer will Texas courts be restricted to an interpretation of law that,
while suitable in a government enforcement action, may be entirely inap-
propriate in a treble damage case.
G. Section 17 46(d): Restriction of Consumer Actions to Laundry List
Items
Section 17.46(d), when read with section 17.50(a)(1), provides that a
consumer may sue only for false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices
176. 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979).
177. Id. (citing Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 15 (2d Cir. 1954)).
178. See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967). See
also Taylor v. Gray, 547 S.W.2d 644, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
179. 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979) (punitive damages awarded
against the principal only when the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the
act; the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him; the agent was
employed in a managerial capacity and was acting within the scope of his employment; or,
the principal ratified or approved the act).
181. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957) (cease and desist order); Standard
Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7(2d Cir. 1954) (cease and desist order).
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specifically enumerated in the subdivisions of section 17.46(b). 82 This is a
significant change from prior law and appears to be responsive to the con-
stitutional difficulties that were perceived to exist in section 17.46(a) of the
1977 statute. 183
In Singleton v. Pennington'8 4 the Dallas court of civil appeals considered
the constitutionality of section 17.46(a) under due process standards. The
issue before the court on motion for rehearing' 18 5 was whether the general
prohibition against false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices con-
tained in section 17.46(a) gave the defendant fair notice at the time of the
transaction that innocent misrepresentations not specifically described in
the Act would subject him to treble damages.'8 6 The defendant in Single-
ton had sold the plaintiff a used boat. Prior to sale the defendant informed
the plaintiff that the boat, motor, and trailer had been repaired and were in
"excellent condition" and "just like new."' 87 Within two months of the
sale the gear housing on the motor had to be repaired. The plaintiff sued
for violations of the DTPA and recovered both actual and exemplary dam-
ages.188
On appeal, the Dallas court found that the defendant's statements did
not fall within the specific prohibitions in section 17.46(b).'8 9 It then ad-
dressed defendant's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that sec-
tion 17.46(a) was unconstitutionally vague since the term "false,
misleading or deceptive acts or practices" was defined nowhere in the Act.
After determining that the treble damage provision of the Act was penal in
nature,' 90 the court reviewed a number of United States Supreme Court
cases dealing with the specificity requirements of penal statuteslg1 and con-
cluded that section 17.46(a) did not give fair notice to the defendant that
his conduct would subject him to the treble damage penalty.' 92 The court
avoided finding the statute unconstitutionally vague, however, by constru-
ing section 17.46(a) to require that false or misleading statements concern-
182. 1979 DTPA § 17.46(d) provides: "For the purposes of the relief authorized in Sub-
division (1) of Subsection (a) of Section 17.50 of this subchapter, the term 'false, misleading,
or deceptive acts or practices' is limited to the acts enumerated in specific subdivisions of
Subsection (b) of this section."
183. See Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Tex. 1978) (concurring opinion
of Chief Justice Greenhill); Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 377-81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ filed).
184. 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ filed).
185. Id. at 374.
186. The "void for vagueness" doctrine requires that a statute be declared void on its
face if the statute "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718-20 (1978); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
187. 568 S.W.2d at 369.
188. The exemplary damages were limited to $500 as a result of a pretrial stipulation.
Id.
189. Id. at 381.
190. Id. at 375-76.
191. Id. at 377.
192. Id.
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ing the need for repair services must be made "knowingly" in order to be
actionable under the Act. 19 3 Because the United States Supreme Court
had previously relied on the requirement of intent or willfulness in up-
holding, against due process attacks, statutes that otherwise would have
been held unconstitutionally vague, 194 the court found section 17.46(a)
constitutional.' 95 The evidence was undisputed that the defendant in Sin-
gleton did not know that his statement was false at the time he made it;'
96
therefore, the decision of the trial court was reversed and judgment ren-
dered in defendant's favor.
A similar concern with the constitutionality of section 17.46(a) was ex-
pressed by Chief Justice Greenhill in his concurring opinion in Spradling v.
Williams. 97 The chief justice stated:
I should like to point out that the Court's opinion makes no holding
with regard to penal damages for the violation of an unlisted or un-
specified act.
I have grave doubts about the constitutionality of penal damages
for the violation of "unlisted" and unspecified unlawful acts. It is one
thing for the Legislature to create a cause of action in tort or contract
for actual damages caused by reliance on unfair and deceptive trade
practices; but it is another thing for it to create a penalty of triple dam-
ages for the violation of unwritten, unlisted and unspecified unlawful
acts. '
98
Unfortunately, the chief justice did not explain the legal basis for distin-
guishing actual damages caused by unfair and deceptive trade practices
from treble damages for the violation of "unwritten, unlisted and unspeci-
fied unlawful acts." In other contexts, however, it has been recognized that
the standards of certainty under the due process clause vary with the sever-
ity of the sanctions imposed.' 99
Taken together, Singleton and Spradling created sufficient doubts about
193. Id. at 379-80. This interpretation was based in part on language in § 17.46(c) that
directed courts to be guided by the laundry list items in § 17.46(b) in construing § 17.46(a),
and in part on the determination that the provisions of subdivision (13) of § [7.46(b) that
dealt with the need for repair services were most closely analogous to the facts before the
court. Subdivision (13) of § 17.46(b) contains a scienter requirement of its own.
194. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33-35 (1963);
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1945). But see criticism of this rationale and line of cases in Collings,
Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 227-31 (1955), and Note,
supra note 186, at 87 n.98.
195. 568 S.W.2d at 380-81.
196. Id. at 369.
197. 566 S.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Tex. 1978).
198. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
199. Note, supra note 186, at 69 n.16. Generally speaking, the certainty required of a
statute is higher in criminal than in civil statutes. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515
(1948); Horn v. Burns & Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir. 1976); Massachusetts Welfare
Rights Org. v. Ott, 421 F.2d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1969). Where a civil statute imposes a forfei-
ture or penalty, however, it will be tested according to the more stringent due process re-
quirements applicable to criminal statutes. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951);
Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ filed).
Indeed that test was applied in Singleton to the imposition of treble damages under the
DTPA. See Testimony on Economic Development, supra note i, tape 1, at 3, 10 & 11. This
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the constitutionality of imposing treble damages for violations of section
17.46(a) to make legislative reform of this provision desirable. That re-
form has been accomplished in section 17.46(d) and section 17.50(a)(1) by
limiting treble damage actions to conduct that violates the specific prohibi-
tions of section 17.46(b). The broad language of section 17.46(a) prohibit-
ing "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" remains unchanged,
except that its enforcement is now limited to actions by public officials.2°°
The constitutional dangers resulting from the vagueness of the proscrip-
tion, however, will be far less severe in most public enforcement actions
because the relief available in such cases is more limited. The attorney
general is not authorized to sue for treble damages. He is authorized to sue
for injunctive relief,2 ' actual damages or restoration of property to injured
parties,2" 2 civil penalties not to exceed $2,000 per violation and $10,000 in
the aggregate, 203 and civil penalties of not more than $10,000 per violation
or a total of $50,000 for violation of the terms of an outstanding injunc-
tion.2° With the exception of the $2,000 to $10,000 penalty, the relief
sought is either compensatory or prospective; therefore, these sanctions are
less subject to constitutional attack than private consumer actions, even if
conduct not within the laundry list is the subject of public enforcement.
Compensatory relief in the form of actual damages or restoration of
property obtained in violation of the statute, i e., rescission, is exclusively
civil in character and should be judged according to the more relaxed con-
stitutional standards governing civil proceedings. 20 5 Similarly, the section
granting injunctive relief and civil penalties for violation of an outstanding
injunction should be subjected to a less stringent standard of certainty
since no sanctions are imposed until after the defendant has been put on
notice by the injunction itself that his conduct is unlawful. 206 As long as
public enforcement proceedings are confined to prospective remedies of
this type,207 the meaning of the phrase "false, misleading, or deceptive acts
may explain the basis for the chief justice's comments in Spradling. See notes 197-98 supra
and accompanying text.
200. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
201. 1977 DTPA § 17.47(a) & (b).
202. Id. § 17.47(d).
203. Id. § 17.47(c).
204. Id. § 17.47(e).
205. See note 199 supra.
206. Collings, supra note 194, at 209, argues:
Where statutory sanctions are purely of prospective effect, it may be unneces-
sary to require the same definiteness as where the penal sanction comes only
after the issuance or violation of an injunction or other court order. If there
can be no deprivation of life, liberty or property until a court order is issued
and violated, the statutory language can be quite vague; it is the order itself
which should be specific. Conversely, however, if such deprivation can hap-
pen, for example where the statute permits an injured private person to sue for
treble damages, even before any court enforcement order, it seems rather obvi-
ous that statutory definiteness must be required if due process is to be re-
garded.
See alio Note, supra note 186, at 77 n.15.
207. The FTC's authority to enter cease and desist orders is prospective in character.
The purpose of such orders is "to prevent illegal practices in the future," FTC v. Ruberoid
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or practices" can be developed and extended on a case-by-case basis much
like the phrases "unfair or deceptive acts or practices '  and "unfair
methods of competition"2 9 have developed under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.2"' The FTC procedure vests in a public body with broad
expertise and no personal financial stake in the outcome of the litigation
the task of developing, under close judicial scrutiny, the rules necessary to
regulate harmful practices unforeseen by the legislature. 2 ' The DTPA
strives for this same flexibility by giving the attorney general similar
prosecutorial powers, and simultaneously limiting the self-interested pri-
vate litigant's right to pursue treble damages to well-defined violations. In
short, the 1979 amendments permit the continued evolution of the DTPA
to meet new forms of deceptive consumer practices, while at the same time
avoiding a constitutional confrontation that seemed imminent under the
old Act.
The attorney general could, of course, force a resolution of the constitu-
tional issue by suing for a $2,000 to $10,000 civil penalty under section
17.47(c) in a case involving conduct not enumerated in the laundry list.
Such an action would pose many of the same notice problems that con-
cerned the courts in Singleton and Spradling.21 2 That confrontation need
not occur in the context of a public enforcement action,2 3 however, if in
the exercise of an informed discretion the attorney general's office limits its
use of civil penalties to laundry list violations, conduct previously declared
unlawful by the courts in injunctive proceedings, or undefined violations
committed with actual knowledge that they were unfair or deceptive and
in violation of the Act.2 14
Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952), and not "to punish or to fasten liability on respondents for
past conduct," FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 706 (1948). In 1975 the FTC was given
authority to seek civil penalties for unfair or deceptive acts or practices committed "with
actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances" that
the act is "unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule." 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(l)(A)
(1976).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
209. Id.
210. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972). See also Devel-
opments in the La--Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1019-20 (1967); Com-
ment, Big Brother's War on Television Advertising. How Extensive is the Regulatory Authority
of the Federal Trade Commission?, 33 Sw. L.J. 683, 687-91 (1979).
211. 1977 DTPA §§ 17.47, 58; see FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40(1972).
• See notes 192-98 supra and accompanying text.
213. The constitutional issue may be unavoidable, however, in private consumer actions
under the 1977 Act. The Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ in Riverside Nat'l Bank v.
Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ granted), on the
constitutionality of imposing penal damages for unspecified acts. See 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 215
(Feb. 10, 1979).
214. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (1976) (similar guidelines imposed upon FTC).
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H. Section 1750(a)(1). Authorization of Consumer Actions for False,
Misleading, or Deceptive Acts or Practices that are Enumerated
in Section 17.46(b)
The amendment to this section implements the limitation imposed by
section 17.46(d) 21" by authorizing consumer actions for false, misleading,
or deceptive acts or practices only to the extent that such acts or practices
are enumerated in section 17.46(b).
I. Section 175O." Causation and Foreseeability
The 1979 legislature amended section 17.50216 by substituting the term
"producing cause" for the term "adversely affected" and thereby may have
modified the Act to allow recovery of unforeseeable damages.21 7 Although
prior to the 1979 amendments a few commentators had suggested that
courts should use a producing cause standard in cases under the DTPA, 8
no court has analyzed the ramifications of such a change.El9 Several
courts, however, have submitted language that approximates the causa-
tion-in-fact language found in the definition of producing cause.
220
215. See notes 182-214 supra and accompanying text.
216. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(a) provides: "A consumer may maintain an action where any
of the following constitute a producing cause of actual damages .... "
217. Senator Meier presented § 17.50(a) to the senate, stating in part:
Mr. President, members, in the discussions had, pertaining to the intent of the
language beginning on line 4, page 7, of the bill in its present form, in attempt-
ing to define when there could be relief under section 17.50, we had adopted
language which provided that if there was a sustaining of actual damages as a
result of any of items 1 through 4, listed in § 17.50(a), that there would be a
cause of action. Language was suggested in our discussions yesterday, which I
believe says the same thing, but just in a different manner, to the effect that
where any of the following, referring that thereby referenced to sections 1
through-subsections 1 through 4 in 17.50(a), constitute a producing cause of
actual damages, then you'd have a cause of action under those items.
And I think it's a clarification of the language that was in the bill to begin
with, and suggest its adoption.
Senator Doggett: [I]f I understand by using producing cause then, a court
would know that in submitting a charge they would use producing cause of
damages as their measure-as appropriate yardstick to the jury.
Senator Meier: Yes, Senator. And I think that's what's customarily being
practiced today, is-and how these cases are being submitted.
Senator Doggett: Thank you.
Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 19-20.
218. See TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION, supra note 2, at 180-82 (1978).
219. Producing cause was used without comment in the following cases: American
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ filed);
O'Shea v. International Business Machs. Corp., 578 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[Ist Dist.] 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.); Charping v. Light, 578 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1979, no writ); Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gray-Taylor, Inc. v. Tennessee, 573 S.W.2d
859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ granted) (using both a proximate and
producing cause in the same charge); Bowman v. Woodmansee, 554 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, no writ); Littleton v. Woods, 538 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
220. For examples of those cases using causation-in-fact language, see Note, SpecialIssue
Submission in Cases Controlled by the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Spradling v Wil-
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By expressly adopting producing cause rather than its more conven-
tional brother proximate cause, it may be claimed that the legislature de-
leted the concept of foreseeability as a necessary element of causation. 2 '
Under the amended Act, a consumer may argue that he need prove only
that damages were in fact caused by a deceptive act or practice. He may
contend that he is not limited to those damages that were foreseeable at the
time the deceptive act or practice took place.
Under this argument, the consumer who purchases a defective part for a
machine may recover lost profits under the 1979 Act even though the seller
had no reason to know that the particular part would be used in the con-
sumer's business. Such a result, however, would be a significant departure
from the rule in contract cases, which limits consequential damages for
breach of warranty to those within the contemplation of the parties.222 A
producing cause standard would also be a significant departure from the
rule in fraud cases in which a proximate cause standard has been used to
diminish the spectrum of potential damages.2 23 Because the producing
cause standard might be interpreted to require the court to apply a simple
causation-in-fact test rather than focus on the objective foreseeability of
damage, it could result in a substantially greater damage award to the
plaintiff.
Traditional limitations on the scope of damages will probably continue
to exist, however, even under the amended Act, due to judicial interpreta-
tions of the term "actual damages" in section 17.50. The courts in apply-
ing the old Act have interpreted the term "actual damages" in accordance
with the settled rules of the common law and have limited the scope of
iams, 32 Sw. L.J. 1043, 1044 n.6 (1978). See also TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION, supra
note 2, at 180 n.13.
221. Compare the following definition of producing cause: "An efficient, exciting, or
contributing cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages complained
of, if any. There can be more than one producing cause." Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794,
801 (Tex. 1975) (quoting with approval issue submitted by trial court), with the prevailing
proximate cause definition: "a natural and continuous sequence, which produces an event
and without which the event would not have occurred; and in order to be a proximate cause,
it must have been reasonably foreseen that such event, or some similar event, was likely to
have resulted from such cause." Turner v. Clark, 412 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Texas courts have recognized that proximate cause is in
essence composed of two elements: cause-in-fact and the foreseeability of the result. See,
e.g., Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1975); Lumpkins v. Thompson,
553 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.). Texas courts have
acknowledged that the foreseeability concept is not an element of producing cause. Hartzell
Propeller Co. v. Alexander, 485 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See also C.A. Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex.
1969).
222. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Univer-
sal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Tex. 1978); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Bettes, 407
S.W.2d 307, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ refd n.r.e.); U.C.C. § 2.715(2) and com-
ment 5 thereunder.
223. See, e.g., Reid v. El Paso Constr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. 1973); Hudson &
Hudson Realtors v. Savage, 545 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); El
Paso Dev. Co. v. Ravel, 339 S.W.2d 360, 366-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1960, writ refd
n.r.e.); Bantuelle v. Jones, 52 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1932, no writ).
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damages even in cases utilizing a producing cause standard. 23a Under
this interpretation, lost profits would not be recoverable in misrepresenta-
tion cases under the DTPA since they are not recoverable in an action for
common law fraud.224 This approach is illustrated by recent DTPA cases
dealing with damage claims for mental anguish.
Courts traditionally have refused recovery for mental anguish, reason-
ing that such injuries were too remote and were not within the contempla-
tion of the parties. 225 The few Texas courts that have directly addressed
that issue in the context of the DTPA have reached the same result, but on
the ground that the DTPA uses the term "actual damages," which at com-
mon law has been held not to include mental anguish unless caused by an
intentional tort or accompanied by physical injury to the plaintiff.226
To the extent that recovery for mental anguish has been denied at com-
mon law because of a lack of foreseeability, 2 1 it could be argued that the
adoption of a producing cause standard reinstates mental anguish as a re-
coverable element of damages under the Act. The DTPA cases that have
rejected recovery of damages for mental anguish, however, do not support
such a view since they limit the scope of recoverable damages even though
a producing cause standard was used in the jury charge. Furthermore,
such cases are not based exclusively on a foreseeability rationale. In Amer-
ican Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown,228 for example, the court empha-
sized the subjective and elusive character of such damages: "If such
damages are recoverable, the plaintiff can always testify concerning his
subjective reactions and thus inject an element of damage that can rarely
be rebutted, has no monetary measure, and is subject to no limits but the
sympathy of the jury and the conscience of a reviewing court., 2 29 These
considerations remain as valid under the amended Act as they were under
the old statute.
On the other hand, there is legislative history from this past legislative
session that lends some credence to the view that recovery of damages for
mental anguish may now be allowable under the Act. Senate Bill 357 as it
originally passed the senate defined actual damages to exclude mental
223a. See cases cited at note 226 infra.
224. See George v. Hesse, 100 Tex. 44, 93 S.W. 107 (1906); Hudson & Hudson Realtors
v. Savage, 545 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); Womack v. Lagow, 200
S.W. 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917, no writ).
225. Otten v. Snowden, 550 S.W.2d 758, 759-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no
writ); Rogowicz v. Taylor & Gray, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973,
writ refd n.r.e.).
226. American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, writ filed); Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619, 622
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). See Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex.
16, 19-20, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65-66 (1954).
227. See Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 649, 254 S.W.2d 81, 86 (1953), quoted in
Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Rogowicz v. Taylor & Gray, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
228. 584 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ filed).
229.. Id. at 297. See also Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 649-50, 254 S.W.2d 81,
86 (1953).
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anguish.2 3' This provision was later deleted in the house and portions of
the house debate indicate a legislative intention to permit recovery for
mental anguish. 3'
One commentator has argued that this legislative history requires that
the term "actual damages" be read to include all damages, whether eco-
nomic, physical, or mental.232 While this conclusion appears to be the
view of at least some of the legislators in the house and is a fair inference
from the debates, the term "actual damages" as used in the old Act was
never changed, no definition of actual damages was ever adopted, and
there is no indication that the house view of the term "actual damages"
was concurred in by the senate. Therefore, even though the senate's at-
tempt to explicitly restrict the meaning of actual damages was defeated,
the original meaning of actual damages in the Act remained unchanged.
Such an absence of change would appear to establish that the prior judicial
interpretations of the term "actual damages" were not incorrect.
The adoption of a "producing cause" standard may nonetheless revive
the mental anguish issue by arguably eliminating the foreseeability re-
quirement. This change is not dispositive, however, since foreseeability
may be derived from the term "actual damages" in those cases that involve
special or consequential damage claims. Moreover, the inherently subjec-
tive and uncertain character of damages for mental anguish when unac-
companied by physical injury remains an important independent
argument against allowing recovery for such damages under the Act, par-
ticularly when any damages awarded may be subject to trebling.
J. Section 17 5O(b)1).- Multiple Damage Recovery
Prior to the enactment of the 1979 amendments 33 the DTPA required
230. Senate Bill 357 as it originally passed the senate provided: "'Actual damages'
means pecuniary loss including reasonably foreseeable incidental and consequential dam-
ages and does not include any payment for mental or physical pain or anguish except in
cases where the act complained of resulted primarily in damages for physical injury to the
person."
231. See Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Con-
sumer Protection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAw-FOR GENERAL
PRACTITIONERS A-8 (1979). Maxwell quotes the following exchange in the house:
Rep. Gibson: . . . Would it [the DTPA's phrase "actual damages" without a
specific statutory definition] include . . . any damages that were incurred by
the plaintiff such as mental anguish?
Rep. Hill: . . . It would include any damages that you could convince the jury
had occurred as a result of the violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Rep. Gibson: . . . So, in other words, any damages involving mental anguish,
any damages that were consequential from (tortious) act of the defendant
would be included in your amendment, is that correct?
Rep. Hill: That's correct.
Id.
232. See id. at A-9 ("The logical conclusion to be drawn from the fact that the legislature
specifically considered, and rejected, a restrictive definition of 'actual damages' is that the
term is to be read to embrace any damages to a consumer, be they economic, physical or
mental.").
233. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1) provides:
In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may obtain:
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the court to treble a consumer's actual damages. Testimony in both the
house and senate during the recent amendment of the DTPA, however,
revealed concern that an award of treble damages for innocent misrepre-
sentations was too harsh a penalty and might ultimately increase the cost
of goods or services to the consumer.23 ' The initial drafts of S.B. 357,
which after modification evolved into the 1979 amendments, required the
consumer to prove that a deceptive act was both intentional and uncon-
scionable before multiple damages were recoverable. 235 The conference
committee diluted that requirement and substituted a provision requiring
that the jury, rather than the court, determine whether damages should be
trebled after a finding that there was a knowing violation of the Act.2 36
The 1979 amendments still provide that the consumer is entitled to both
actual and punitive damages for inadvertent deceptive acts or practices;
23 7
(1) the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact. In addition
the court shall award two times that portion of the actual damages that does
not exceed $ 1,000. If the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant
was committed knowingly, the trier of fact may award not more than three
times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000 ....
234. Senator Meier opened the proceedings on S.B. 357 before the Committee on Eco-
nomic Development, stating in part: "I'd like to ... say to the committee that as you hear
from the witnesses, there'll be many examples of how the act in its present form has been not
only inequitable but retarding to commerce in Texas .... " Testimony on Economic De-
velopment, supra note 1, tape 1, at 1. Representative Jones suggested the central theme
concerning the amendment of the DTPA in the following statement:
I am concerned that as time passes an excessive number of treble damages
awards will greatly increase the cost of doing business. Prices will be in-
creased to cover judgments paid, and judgments anticipated. By overcompen-
sating the few we risk harm to the collective group of all consumers. And
while I'm sure that a majority of consumers support making the wrong[ed]
consumer whole, as well as punishing the knowing commission of a deceptive
trade practice, I do not believe that the majority of consumers want to enrich
the few at the expense of the many.
Moreover, treble damages are punitive in nature, and while they might be
justified in 90% of the cases, they should not be tolerated if they produce injus-
tice in 10% of the cases.
Transcript of Hearings of the State Affairs Committee, House of Representatives on H.B.
744, Feb. 26, 1979, at 3-4 [hereinafter cited as State Affairs Committee Hearings]. Tran-
scripts of these hearings obtained by the authors are on file at the Underwood Law Library,
Southern Methodist Unniversity.
235. Before the conference committee revisions, S.B. 357 provided that the jury could
award up to treble damages if the defendant's acts were unconscionable. Unconscionability
was in turn defined as:
"[Tiaking advantage of a person's lack of knowledge, ability or experience."
Such action must now be an intentional taking advantage of. Previously, the
requirements for an action to be unconscionable were that there was a taking
advantage or a gross disparity in the value received and consideration paid.
Now both of these requirements must be met for an action to be unconsciona-
ble.
Meier, Bill Analysis: S.B. 357, at 1. A transcript of this bill analysis is on file at the Under-
wood Law Library, Southern Methodist University. After conference committee, "know-
ingly" was defined as it appears in the 1979 DTPA § 17.45(9).
236. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
237. It is evident from the following colloquy that the legislature intended that actual
damages be recoverable without any proof of scienter.
Senator Doggett: [I]n terms of getting actual damages and [attorneys'] fees,
there is no requirement of scienter, of knowingly or intentionally, you do have
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treble damages, however, are only automatically computed to the extent
that the consumer's actual damages do not exceed $1,000.238 As to actual
damages over $1,000, multiple recovery under the amended Act is allowed
only if the deceptive act or practice is found to have been knowingly made.
In that event, the trier of fact may award "not more than three times the
amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000.,,239
If, for example, the jury finds that the consumer has suffered $1,400 ac-
tual damages, the consumer will receive an award of $3,400, comprised of
$1,400 of actual damages, plus $2,000 awarded by the court (two times that
portion of the actual damages that does not exceed $1,000). This $3,400
consists of an effective trebling of the first $1,000, plus the remaining $400
of actual damages. Under the pre-amendment law, that consumer, on the
same proof, would have been entitled to three times the $1,400, or $4,200.
If, under the amended law, the consumer proves that the defendant know-
ingly committed the deceptive act or practice, he also would be entitled to
ask the jury to award up to $4,200, that being three times the amount of
actual damages awarded in excess of $1,000 plus the $3,000 awarded on
the trebling of the first $1,000 of actual damages. The difference, then, is
that under earlier law trebling was automatic no matter what the actual
damages were. Under the amended DTPA, only the first $1,000 of actual
damages is automatically trebled; multiple damages on actual damages ex-
ceeding $1,000 requires proof of a knowingly deceptive act.
To simplify the submission of the trebling issue in jury trials, the court
should first ask the jury to determine the amount of actual damages and
then instruct the jury to subtract $1,000 from that amount if actual dam-
ages exceed $1,000. The court should then advise the jury that they may
award additional damages not to exceed three times the amount of the
remainder, but only if they find that the deceptive act or practice was com-
mitted knowingly. Thus, in cases where the actual damages exceed $1,000
the court can determine the correct amount of the judgment by adding
the requirement of an unconscionability to get treble damages, but there's no
state of mind, intent, knowingly or whatever, that you have to do to get your
actual damages?
Senator Meier: That's correct, Senator.
Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 2-3.
238. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
239. Id. It has been suggested that the amended Act allows damages for knowing viola-
tions in excess of the treble damages allowed under the old statute. See Maxwell, The 1979
Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, in STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW-FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS A-7 (1979).
Under this approach, a successful consumer could recover four times the amount by which
the consumer's actual damages exceed $1,000. For example, in a case involving $1,400 ac-
tual damages, the consumer would receive $1,400 (actual damages) + $2,000 (court awarded
bonus damages) + $1,200 (treble the amount of damages in excess of $1,000 [,e., $400]), for
a total of $4,600.
The error in the above computations is found in trebling the $400 figure (ie., $1,200) and
then adding that amount to an actual damage figure of $1,400, afigure that already contains
$400 in excess of $1,000. Under this approach, the amount in excess of $1,000 [i.e., the $400
figure] is actually quadrupled, even though § 17.50(b)(1) clearly states that the "trier of fact
may not award more than three times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000."
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$2,000 to the sum of the actual damages plus the punitive damages found.
If, on the other hand, the jury finds actual damages of less than $1,000, no
further jury findings on damages are necessary and the amount of the
judgment can be determined simply by trebling the amount of actual dam-
ages found. The jury should be carefully instructed that it need not multi-
ply the actual damages exceeding $1,000 by a whole number, but may
award any fractional multiple of actual damages up to three times actual
damages.24
The legislature was apparently as concerned about the deterrent effect as
about the compensatory aspects of the Act; thus, it would seem to follow
that the jury should be instructed to consider the defendant's culpability in
assessing damages.24 ' Accordingly, the jury should be instructed that the
multiple damages awarded are not solely to compensate the consumer, but
also are awarded to deter the defendant then before the jury, as well as to
deter others similarly situated.
It is unclear whether the jury should be advised that plaintiff could re-
ceive up to a $2,000 "bonus" under the 1979 DTPA. On the one hand,
section 17.50(b)(1) provides that the court, rather than the jury, shall
award twice the actual damages not in excess of $1,000. On the other
hand, newly amended section 17.50(b)(1) grants the jury more authority in
determining what exemplary damages should be awarded in achieving the
twin goals of complete recovery and full deterrence than was granted in
old section 17.50(b)(1).
There are no appellate decisions in Texas that discuss the propriety of
disclosing the potentiality of a multiple damage award to the jury. In Pol-
lock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co.,242 confronted with a closely
analagous question, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the jury should not be apprised that antitrust awards are trebled. The
court reasoned that if the jury knew that the damages would be trebled,
they might reduce the actual damages award and thereby undermine the
punitive purposes of the Clayton Act. The court stated that it was the
jury's duty to ascertain actual damages and the court's duty to treble those
damages.24 Thus, according to the court, as trebling antitrust damages is
not relevant to any function performed by the jury, the jury should not be
informed of the trebling.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis is persuasive as to the mandatory multiple
damage provision of the pre-1979 DTPA, but it is not controlling in situa-
240. There is no express provision mandating an integer as a multiplier. Section
17.50(b)(I) simply provides that the jury may award "not more than three times the amount
of actual damages." Thus, the jury should be instructed that it can select a figure not more
than three times the amount of actual damages.
241. In Mayer v. Duke, 72 Tex. 445, 453, 10 S.W. 565, 569 (1889), the court stated that a
jury shall consider: (I) the degree of the outrage produced by the evil, (2) the frequency of
the evil, and (3) the size of the award held to deter similar wrongs in the future. See also
Lubbock Bail Bond v. Joshua, 416 S.W.2d 523, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no
writ).
242. 498 F.2d 1240, 1242 (5th Cir. 1974).
243. Id. at 1243.
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tions where the jury has the duty to determine the amount of any exem-
plary damages. Accordingly, the Pollock analysis may control pre-
amendment DTPA cases, but should not control post-amendment cases
since the 1979 amendments clearly grant the jury responsibility for award-
ing punitive damages.2" Rather than shielding the jury from the fact that
punitive damages may be levied in apprehension that such knowledge
would result in less punishment, the Sixty-Sixth Texas Legislature dele-
gated to the trier of fact the ultimate decision of the amount of punitive
damages, if any, to be awarded. Preventing the jury from considering the
fact that as much as a $2,000 fine will automatically be levied against a
defendant found liable under the Act irrespective of his state of mind is to
withhold information that is highly relevant to the jury's function of deter-
mining the amount of any additional punitive damages that may be neces-
sary to punish and deter the defendant. 245 Thus, the trebling provision of
section 17.50(b)(1), unlike the treble damage provision in its predecessor,
should be disclosed to the jury if punitive damages are sought.
K. Sections 1750(c) and (d)." Attorneys' Fees
Section 17.50(c) provides for an award of reasonable and necessary at-
torneys' fees and court costs to a defendant if the plaintiffs DTPA suit was
groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.246
Section 17.50(d) provides for an award of court costs and reasonable and
necessary attorneys' fees to the plaintiff who prevails in any suit under the
DTPA.247 Both of these provisions were amended in 1979 by deleting the
requirement that attorneys' fees be "reasonable in relation to the amount
of work expended, '2 48 substituting instead the requirement that such fees
be "reasonable and necessary. ,249
By requiring that attorneys' fees be necessary as well as reasonable, the
1979 amendments make the DTPA consistent with interpretations of arti-
cle 2226, the principle Texas attorneys' fees statute.25° Further, by elimi-
244. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
245. If given no information of the extra $2,000, all other factors remaining the same, the
jury could decide for a higher multiple of actual damages and in so doing, excessively pun-
ish the defendant. If, on the other hand, the jury is informed that the defendant has already
been fined $2,000, the jury would probably adjust the multiple damage award to a lesser,
and probably more accurate amount.
246. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(c) provides: "On a finding by the court that an action under
this section was groundless and brought in bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harass-
ment, the court shall award to the defendant reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and
court costs."
247. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(d) provides: "Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded
court costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees."
248. 1977 DTPA §§ 17.50(b)(1) & (c).
249. See notes 246 & 247 supra. The legislature also made it clear that attorneys' fees
could be recovered in injunction and restitution cases. Under the 1977 DTPA it had been
unclear whether recovery of attorneys' fees in such cases was provided for. But see United
Postage Corp. v. Krammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).
250. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); see, e.g., McFad-
den v. Bresler Malls, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 258, 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975), mod/ied, 548
S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
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nating the requirement that attorneys' fees be reasonable in relation to the
amount of work expended, the 1979 amendments eliminate the possibility
that an attorney fee award could be made for work actually expended in a
case but unnecessary to the prosecution of the claim. Accordingly, the
amendments appear designed to discourage attorney fee awards for unnec-
essary work. If that was the purpose of the amendment, however, it may
have been unnecessary.25" ' Although article 2226 recites only that the court
may award reasonable fees, that statute has been interpreted as requiring
proof that attorneys' fees are both reasonable and necessary to the claim
asserted.252 It is difficult to imagine a court awarding fees simply on the
basis of the hours expended on DTPA litigation without regard for
whether the work was necessary.
The amendments would also appear to be superfluous in the context of
attorneys' fees in multiple claim cases. For example, under existing law,
the party seeking attorneys' fees in cases where some claims are subject to
attorneys' fees awards and some are not is required to allocate the work
expended among the various claims, including those claims for which he
seeks recovery under article 2226.253 At least two courts, interpreting the
pre-amendment DTPA, have arrived at this same result without the
amended language.254 Of course, to the extent that proof of a claim in
which attorneys' fees are recoverable may overlap with proof of claims in
which they are not, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover for the entire
case. 255 Use of the term "necessary," however, was not essential to achieve
such a result.
Defendants may also recover attorneys' fees under the Act. Section
17.50(c) has provided from its inception that "[o]n a finding by the court"
of a groundless or bad faith lawsuit, the defendant "may," and after the
1979 amendments, "shall" be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees. The is-
sue is therefore one for the court to determine and does not concern the
jury.256 Unfortunately, the Act gives the court no guidance in determining
25 1. Senator Doggett: Senator, do I understand then, by putting in reasonable and
necessary that this will insure that any work expended is not unnecessary work
being done, but only that work which the court or the jury in the-whoever is
the trier of fact, finds was necessary work expended in one of these cases?
Senator Meier: Yes sir, that's right, Senator. It's a standard accepted prac-
tice of having the trier of fact determine that the attorneys [sic] fees actually
rendered were both reasonable in the terms of everyone of the concepts of-
that we looked at in terms of reasonability, and that they were necessary in the
light of the attendant circumstances.
Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 24.
252. McFadden v. Bresler Malls, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 258, 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975), modified, 548 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
253. For a general discussion of the recoverability of attorneys' fees, see I S. SPEISER,
ATTORNEYS' FEES § 12:3 (1973).
254. Cantrell v. First Nat'l Bank, 560 S.W.2d 721, 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
255. See, e.g., Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).
256. But see Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), where the trial court had presented the issues under a § 17.50(c) case to the jury.
See also O'Shea v. International Business Machs. Corp., 578 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ.
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whether a suit is groundless. Presumably, if the issues raised by the suit
survive a motion for directed verdict there are at least some facts that form
the basis of a lawsuit.257 Accordingly, if a DTPA claim survives an appli-
cation for directed verdict, it would be logically inconsistent for the court
to find the plaintiffs case groundless under section 17.50(c).
If the plaintiff loses his DTPA claim on a motion for either directed
verdict or summary judgment, the defendant must then show that the suit
was instituted in "bad faith," or "for the purpose of harassment in order to
recover attorneys' fees." '258 The defendant attempting to prove "bad faith"
or "harassment" will probably be required to prove that the consumer's
claim was motivated by a malicious or discriminatory purpose.25 9 Per-
sonal ill will or spite on the part of the consumer toward the defendant is
relevant to the issue of malice,26° although ill will is not a prerequisite to a
finding of malice.26' Even if no ill will existed between the parties, the
defendant may be able to show that the consumer was motivated by a
reckless disregard for the defendant's rights.262 In such cases, malice may
be inferred from proof that the consumer did not have a good faith belief
that there was a basis for his claim. 263 Although not an absolute defense,
the fact that the consumer acted on the advice of counsel should be one
factor considered. 264
L. Section 1750A.- Procedures Governing Offers of Settlement
This section was extensively modified by the 1979 amendments. Under
the 1977 version of the Act section 17.50A provided several different af-
firmative defenses to an award of treble damages, including bona fide er-
ror, a seasonable offer of settlement by the defendant, failure by the
consumer to give written notice of his complaint prior to suit, or failure to
allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to cure an alleged breach of
warranty.265 The 1979 Act abolishes the bona fide error and opportunity
to cure defenses, 266 creates several new defenses that are separately stated
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (issue of whether lawsuit groundless for
court but harassment and bad faith issue for jury). Such a result clearly is uncalled for by
the statute.
257. TEx. R. Civ. P. 268; Cline v. Insurance Exch., 154 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1941), aff'd, 140 Tex. 175, 166 S.W.2d 677 (1943).
258. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(c).
259. Kelly v. Gilbert, 437 F. Supp. 201, 221 (D. Mont. 1976); Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F.
Supp. 760, 772 (E.D. Wis. 1975).





264. Terk v. Deaton, 555 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
265. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A.
266. See id. §§ 17.50A(1) & (3). These changes may not be as significant as they first
a ppear. For example, even before the opportunity to cure defense was added to the Act in
1977, courts had held that the notice and opportunity to cure requirements of TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) were applicable to a breach of war-
ranty claim under the DTPA. See Southwest Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ross, 580 S.W.2d 2, 4
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in section 17.50B,26 7 and substantially alters the written notice and settle-
ment offer procedures.
Section 17.50A now contains five subsections, (a) through (e). 268 Sub-
section (a) places an affirmative obligation on the aggrieved consumer
seeking damages under section 17.50(b)(1) to give. written notice to the po-
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Import Motors, Inc. v. Mat-
thews, 557 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The abolition of
the opportunity to cure defense in the 1979 Act therefore would appear to return the Act to
its pre-1977 status in which notice and opportunity to cure were still required. But see
United Postage Corp. v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no
writ), in which a jury finding that the defendant did not have a sufficient opportunity to cure
the defect was disregarded by the court because the claim arose prior to the effective date of
the 1977 amendments to the Act.
Abolition of the bona fide error defense would also appear to be of little practical signifi-
cance since the amended Act provides that punitive damages based on actual damages in
excess of $1,000 are recoverable only if the prohibited conduct was committed knowingly.
1979 DTPA § 17.50(b)(1). In most, if not all cases, this scienter requirement will give the
defendant much broader protection for clerical error or other forms of inadvertent conduct
than the bona fide error defense did under the old act.
267. See discussion of § 17.50B at text accompanying notes 309-25 infra.
268. The amended § 17.50A reads:
(a) As a prerequisite to filing a suit seeking damages under Subdivision (1)
of Subsection (b) of Section 17.50 of this subchapter against any person, a
consumer shall give written notice to the person at least 30 days before filing
the suit advising the person of the consumer's specific complaint and the
amount of actual damages and expenses, including attorneys' fees, if any, rea-
sonably incurred by the consumer in asserting the claim against the defendant.
(b) If the giving of 30 days' written notice is rendered impracticable by
reason of the necessity of filing suit in order to prevent the expiration of the
statute of limitations or if the consumer's claim is asserted by way of counter-
claim, the notice provided for in Subsection (a) of this section is not required,
but the tender provided for by Subsection (c) of this section and by Subsection
(d), Section 1T.50B of this subchapter may be made within 30 days after the
filing of the suit or counterclaim.
(c) Any person who receives the written notice provided by Subsection (a)
of this section may, within 30 days after the receipt of the notice, tender to the
consumer a written offer of settlement, including an agreement to reimburse
the consumer for the attorneys' fees, if any, reasonably incurred by the con-
sumer in asserting his claim up to the date of the written notice. A person who
does not receive such a written notice due to the consumer's suit or counter-
claim being filed as provided for by Subsection (b) of this section may, within
30 days after the filing of such suit or counterclaim, tender to the consumer a
written offer of settlement, including an agreement to reimburse the consumer
for the attorneys' fees, if any, reasonably incurred by the consumer in assert-
ing his claim up to the date the suit or counterclaim was filed. Any offer of
settlement not accepted within 30 days of receipt by the consumer shall be
deemed to have been rejected by the consumer.
(d) A settlement offer made in compliance with Subsection (c) of this sec-
tion, if rejected by the consumer, may be filed with the court together with an
affidavit certifying its rejection. If the court finds that the amount tendered in
the settlement offer is the same or substantially the same as the actual damages
found by the trier of fact, the consumer may not recover an amount in excess
of the amount tendered in the settlement offer or the amount of actual dam-
ages found by the trier of fact, whichever is less.
(e) The tender of an offer of settlement is not an admission of engaging in
an unlawful act or practice or of liability under this Act. Evidence of a settle-
ment offer may be introduced only to determine the reasonableness of the
settlement offer as provided for by Subsection (d) of this section.
Reprinted at 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 603, § 5, at 1330-31 (Vernon).
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tential defendant at least thirty days before filing suit advising the defend-
ant of the consumer's specific complaint and "the amount of actual
damages and expenses, including attorneys' fees, if any, reasonably in-
curred by the consumer in asserting the claim." '269
This subsection makes at least four important changes in the notice re-
quirement. First, notice is now "a prerequisite to filing a suit, '270 whereas
under the old Act the plaintiff's failure to provide notice afforded the de-
fendant a defense to treble damages only. 27' Because the notice require-
ment is imposed by statute rather than by common law, it is mandatory,
and suits brought without proper notice are thus not maintainable. 72 Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff must plead and prove notice in (b)(1) cases 273 or
risk a gauntlet of special exceptions 274 and motions for directed verdict. 275
Therefore, compliance with the notice requirement in suits alleging viola-
tions of the laundry list is particularly important under the amended Act.
The Act was further modified by requiring the consumer to advise the
potential defendant of the consumer's "specific complaint." Prior law only
required written notice of the "consumer's complaint," without requiring
the consumer to define precisely what was at issue.276 This change appears
designed to eliminate notices that are merely pro forma efforts to comply
with the statute, providing so little detail to the defendant that he cannot
properly evaluate the plaintiff's claim. Such vague notices frustrate the
purpose of section 17.50A, which is designed primarily to facilitate out-of-
court settlement of claims.
Amended section 17.50A also adds the requirement that written notice
be given "at least 30 days before filing the suit. '"277 Prior law allowed the
defendant to avoid treble damages by showing that he received no written
notice "before suit was filed., 278 Thus, under the old law the plaintiff
could send notice to the defendant one day and file suit the next and still
recover treble damages if he prevailed at trial. This possibility was incon-
sistent with the spirit of a notice provision designed to enable the parties to
settle their differences before going to court. The amended Act affirma-
tively requires the plaintiff to refrain from suit for at least thirty days after
giving notice so that the out-of-court settlement process will have a reason-
able chance to operate before the courts become involved.
269. 1979 DTPA § 17.50A(a).
270. Id. (emphasis added).
271. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A(2).
272. Industrial Accident Bd. v. Glenn, 144 Tex. 378, 382, 190 S.W.2d 805, 807 (1945);
Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 557-58, 285 S.W. 1084, 1087 (1926).
273. See Southwestern Associated Tel. Co. v. City of Dalhart, 254 S.W.2d 819, 825 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref d n.r.e.); Parsons v. City of Fort Worth, 63 S.W. 889, 890
(Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ refd).
274. See Kinnear v. Scurlock Oil Co., 334 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
275. Sawyer v. El Paso & N.E. Ry., 108 S.W. 718, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ);
City of Fort Worth v. Shero, 41 S.W. 704, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ ref'd).
276. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A(2).
277. 1979 DTPA § 17.50A(a).
278. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A(2).
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The final and perhaps most important addition to subsection (a) of sec-
tion 17.50A requires that the consumer state in his written notice the
"amount of actual damages and expenses, including attorneys' fees, if any,
reasonably incurred. . . in asserting the claim."'279 By requiring the con-
sumer to provide the defendant with this information, a basis for settle-
ment discussions is more quickly established. Under prior law the
consumer was not required to state the amount of his damages and attor-
neys' fees in the notice. 280 As a result, the defendant had to request such
information from the consumer in order to make a settlement offer under
section 17.50A(2), and rely on the consumer's cooperation. If however, the
information was not forthcoming within thirty days after written notice
was given, the defendant had to choose between making a guess as to the
amount to be tendered or not tendering at all and thereby losing all hope
of establishing a section 17.50A(2) defense to treble damages. Because of
this dilemma, the courts may eventually impose a duty on the consumer to
cooperate with the defendant in ascertaining the amount of the consumer's
damages and expenses in cases filed under the old Act.281 The amended
Act, by making this obligation explicit and requiring the information to be
furnished with the notice itself, avoids unnecessary delays in initiating the
settlement process. It is arguable, however, that the statute is still deficient
in that it fails to provide a mechanism for discouraging the consumer from
making inflated damage and attorney fee demands that can destroy the
efficacy of the settlement process.282
279. 1979 DTPA § 17.50A(a).
280. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A(2).
281. See Comment, What Hath the Legislature Wrought? A Critique of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act as Amended in 1977, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 525, 536 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Deceptive Trade Practices Act]. See also Comment, Substantial Perform-
ance. The Real Alternative to Perfect Tender Under the U.C.C., 12 Hous. L. REV. 437, 438
(1975); A. CORBIN, 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1233 (1964).
282. The Act contains no incentive for the consumer to accurately and fairly estimate his
damages. In fact, precisely the opposite may be true since he loses his claim for treble dam-
ages if the defendant tenders the amount of the plaintiff's claim. An exaggerated demand,
therefore, is potentially beneficial to the consumer because it has the capacity for producing
either an inflated settlement or else discouraging any settlement offer, leaving the plaintiff's
claim for treble damages intact. The problem has not gone unnoticed in legislative hearings,
but it has yet to be dealt with effectively. As one witness testified during the hearings on S.B.
No. 357:
Unfortunately, this [notice requirement] of the statute has no teeth in it. By
that I mean that there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff in most of these cases
from simply giving a pro forma notice, in other words just literally to comply
with the statutory mandate and then going ahead and instituting his suit for
treble damages. Since he loses nothing, ah, by doing so, the plaintiff has no
real incentive to try to resolve his differences with the seller and that was one
of the purposes, I think, that the act had because our courts were being liter-
ally inundated with deceptive trade practices cases. We wanted to try to
achieve some sort of a method whereby consumers would have an opportunity
to conciliate before resorting to the litigation process and that, of course, has
not proven true. . . .Now, in the common case that we get and I'm speaking
now in defending, ah, in some of my practices, defending car dealers, the com-
mon thing that we get is we get a letter from somebody who has purchased a
car and they'll say you represented to me that I was going to get an AM-FM
stereo radio and I checked it out and I actually only have an AM-FM radio
1979]
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Section 17.50A(b) creates two exceptions to the notice requirement dis-
cussed above. Under this provision, notice is not required if suit must be
filed to prevent the expiration of the statute of limitations or if the con-
sumer's claim is asserted as a counterclaim. In such circumstances, the
offer of settlement described in sections 17.50A(c) and (d) may be made
within thirty days after the suit or counterclaim is filed. This provision is
new and covers a number of contingencies not dealt with under the old
law.
Section 17.50A(c) allows the defendant to tender to the consumer a writ-
ten offer of settlement, including attorneys' fees, within thirty days after
receipt of the notice, or within thirty days of the filing of a suit or counter-
claim in cases covered by subsection (b). Any offer of settlement not ac-
cepted within thirty days of receipt by the consumer is deemed rejected.
This provision differs from the old Act in a number of important respects.
First, the new Act does not appear to require a tender of expenses as
well as attorneys' fees. Section 17.50A(c) simply requires that the written
settlement offer include "an agreement to reimburse the consumer for the
attorneys' fees, if any, reasonably incurred by the consumer in asserting his
claim." '283 "Expenses" are not mentioned. Under the old Act, the defend-
ant had to tender "the expenses, including attorney's fees, if any, reason-
ably incurred by the consumer in asserting his claim against the
defendant." '284 This deletion of expenses from the tender provision of sec-
tion 17.50A(c) is puzzling in light of the fact that section 17.50A(a) of the
new Act still requires the amount of expenses, including attorneys' fees, to
be included in the notice sent to the defendant. Requiring a statement of
the amount of expenses to be included in the notice sent to the defendant
might seem inconsistent with not requiring the defendant to include such
expenses in the settlement offer. The notice of expenses is necessary, how-
ever, because of an additional settlement offer procedure in section
17.50B(d) that does contain a requirement that expenses be included in
any tender made under that provision.28 5
The tender provisions of the new Act also differ from the old Act by
expressly limiting the amount of attorneys' fees to be tendered to those fees
and of course the dealer, if that's the case, in most instances would be de-
lighted to change out the radio because it was an error on our part if the radio
wasn't correct to begin with but instead we get a letter from the lawyer that
says my client has suffered the following damages: A. he wants the purchase
pnce of his car returned, B. he wants $25,000 worth of attorneys [sic] fees, C.
he wants $50,000 worth of mental anguish. Now what do I do? How do I
advise that client? Because the consumer has complied literally with the stat-
ute but of course not with the spirit of the statute and there is no requirement
that he make his allegations in his demand letter reasonable or temperate or
that there be any real legitimate attempt to conciliate those differences and this
is one of the things that I think is most seriously wrong with the act as it stands
now.
Testimony on Economic Development, supra note 1, tape 1, at 5-6 (statement of Jack Ayres).
283. 1979 DTPA § 17.50A(c).
284. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A(2) (emphasis added).
285. See discussion of § 17.50B(d) at notes 321-25 infra and accompanying text.
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incurred by the consumer "up to the date of the written notice"2 6 or "up
to the date the suit or counterclaim was filed." '287 This new language is
probably not so much a substantive change as a clarification of prior law.
It makes clear that the defendant need not tender future attorneys' fees
and suggests by implication that the attorneys' fee amount to be included
in the consumer's notice under section 17.50A(a) should be similarly lim-
ited.
One of the most significant differences between the tender provisions of
subsection (c) and the old Act is that the new statute permits the tender of
a "written offer of settlement" instead of a tender of the "cash value of the
consideration received from the consumer or the cash value of the benefit
promised, whichever is greater." '288 This change avoids the necessity for
tendering money, a requirement that may have existed under the old "cash
value" standard and may still exist under section 17.50B of the 1979
Act.
289
At common law, in order to be legally sufficient a tender must be in
"current coin of the realm" 29° and the tenderer must relinquish possession
of the sum tendered.2 9' Neither readiness and ability to pay292 nor the
tender of a check are sufficient.293 Adoption of an offer of settlement stan-
dard is therefore a marked improvement over the old Act because it avoids
these common law requirements. To the extent that the old "cash value"
standard required a tender of money in conformity with common law
tender requirements, it established a less flexible procedure that may have
impeded the early settlement of disputes or created a trap for unwary de-
fendants. If a tender under the old Act had to meet common law tender
requirements, then a defendant who believed that he had limited his liabil-
ity under the Act to single damages by making a reasonable settlement
offer or tendering a check in payment of the claim might be in for a rude
surprise when judgment was entered.294
Finally, subsection (c) places a limit of thirty days on the consumer's
286. 1979 DTPA § 17.50A(c).
287. Id.
288. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A(2) (emphasis added).
289. 1979 DTPA § 17.50(B)(d)(I) requires the tender of "the amount of actual damages
claimed." This tender requirement is separate and distinct from the tender requirement of
§ 17.50A and provides an absolute defense rather than a defense only to treble damages.
See notes 321-25 infra and accompanying text.
290. See Baucum v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963).
291. Id.
292. Bayless v. Strahan, 182 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, writ ref'd
w.o.m.); Richey v. Stanley, 38 S.W.2d 1104, 1105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931, no
writ).
293. Moore v. Copeland, 478 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dunn v. Ligon, 430 S.W.2d 704, 707-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1968, no writ).
294. A defendant caught unaware by common law tender requirements might still be
able to avoid the imposition of treble damages by arguing waiver. If the plaintiff refuses the
tender on grounds other than the medium of payment or the failure to relinquish possession
of the sum tendered, these inadequacies may be waived and the tender is legally sufficient.
See Dunn v. Ligon, 430 S.W.2d 704, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ);
Bayless v. Strahan, 182 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, writ ref d w.o.m.).
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time to respond to the defendant's offer; after thirty days the offer is
deemed rejected. This provision prevents the plaintiff from unreasonably
delaying his response to the defendant's offer in order to monitor the de-
velopment of the lawsuit. Allowance of such delay would effectively de-
feat the purpose of the settlement procedure since a great deal of court
time and unnecessary expenses could be incurred if the plaintiff unreason-
ably delays in deciding whether to accept or reject the settlement offer.295
Section 17.50A(d) provides a procedure for the filing with the court of
any settlement offer that has been rejected along with an affidavit certify-
ing to its rejection. Subsection (d) then provides:
If the court finds that the amount tendered in the settlement offer is
the same or substantially the same as the actual damages found by the
trier of fact, the consumer may not recover an amount in excess of the
amount tendered in the settlement offer or the amount of actual dam-
ages found by the trier of fact, whichever is less.296
This provision makes a number of important changes. First, and per-
haps most significant, it substitutes "actual damages" for the phrase "the
cash value of the consideration received from the consumer or the cash
value of the benefit promised, whichever is greater,, 297 which appeared in
the 1977 Act. This is an improvement over the old Act since the term
"benefit promised" is of uncertain legal meaning and difficult to apply.298
Secondly, a defendant who makes a reasonable settlement offer has a
defense to treble damages even if the amount tendered is somewhat less
than the amount of damages ultimately found by the trier of fact. Under
the new Act a court need only find that the amount tendered was the same
or "substantially the same" as the actual damages found by the trier of
fact.2 9 9 Thus, a defendant who made a reasonable settlement offer prior to
trial will not be penalized with treble damages simply because his offer was
not identical to the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact.3"
Mere silence in response to the tender, however, is not a waiver of the tender defects. Moore
v. Copeland, 478 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
295. The 1979 amendments do not appear to deal with settlement offers that must be
accepted in less than 30 days. Since the act is silent on the question, it would seem that the
defendant, as master of his own offer, could place any reasonable conditions on its accept-
ance not contrary to law.
296. 1979 DTPA § 17.50A(d).
297. 1977 DTPA § 17.50A(2).
298. See TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 8.06, at 193; Comment, Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act, supra note 281, at 536.
299. The amount of variance allowed by the term "substantially the same" will have to
be established by future cases and will probably turn on the circumstances of each case. The
term "substantially the same," like the term "approximately," would appear to contemplate
a reasonable variance between what was aimed at and what was achieved. See, e.g., Syring-
Workman, Inc. v. Colbert, 532 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ retfd
n.r.e.); Norton v. Menard Lumber Co., 523 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, no writ).
300. It is worth noting that § 17.50A(d) deals with the avoidance of treble damages in
terms of the similarity between the amount of the tender and the amount of actual damages
found by the trier of fact; it does not mention attorneys' fees. This omission raises a number
of interesting possibilities. Suppose a tender was for more than the actual damages awarded
by the trier of fact, but contained either no offer of attorneys' fees or an inadequate offer,
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Finally, it is theoretically possible for a plaintiff under the amended Act
to receive less than the full amount of his actual damages since, in the
event of an adequate tender rejected by the consumer, the plaintiff is lim-
ited to the lesser of the amount tendered or the amount found by the trier
of fact. If the amount tendered is only slightly less than the amount found
by the trier of fact, the consumer will thus be limited to the lesser amount.
In such circumstances, however, the variance from the amount of actual
damages can never be large since the court must first find that the tender is
substantially the same as the amount of actual damages found by the trier
of fact before such a limitation becomes applicable.
The final paragraph in section 17.50A, subsection (e), deals with the ad-
missibility and purpose for which settlement offers may be introduced at
trial. The first sentence of this provision provides that the tender of an
offer of settlement is not an admission of engaging in an unlawful act or
practice or of liability under the Act. This part of the provision closely
tracks the common law rules on the admissibility of settlement offers.30 '
The second sentence of subsection (e) appears to go beyond the common
law, however, in providing that "[e]vidence of a settlement offer may be
introduced only to determine the reasonableness of the settlement offer as
provided for by Subsection (d) of this section."30 2 Subsection (d) permits
the settlement offer to be filed with the court together with an affidavit
certifying to the offer's rejection. Subsection (e) purports to make this pro-
cedure the exclusive method for introducing the settlement offer. Accord-
ingly, subsections (d) and (e) when read together would appear to prohibit
introduction of settlement offers before the jury for any purpose other than
to show the reasonableness of the settlement offer.
Such a comprehensive restriction on the admissibility of settlement of-
fers in DTPA cases appears to be broader than the limitations imposed by
the common law. 3 3 The adoption of an exclusionary rule of evidence,
even though attorneys' fees were later awarded by the court. Would such a tender be suffi-
cient to avoid treble damages? The defendant could argue that attorneys' fees are irrelevant
to the limitation on trebling in subsection (d). The plaintiff, however, could argue in re-
sponse that subsection (d) refers only to a settlement offer made in compliance with subsec-
tion (c), and subsection (c) requires the tender offer to include a tender of attorneys' fees.
The defendant who makes no offer to reimburse the plaintiff for attorneys' fees is probably
not therefore entitled to avoid treble damages since his offer was not made in compliance
with the Act.
301. See Masco Internat'l, Inc. v. Stokley, 567 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Simmons v. Capital Diesel & Indus. Mach. Works, Inc., 380
S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ refd n.r.e.); Howell v. Bowden, 368
S.W.2d 842, 847 JTex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref d n.r.e.); C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY,
TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1142, at 29-30 (2d ed. 1956).
302. 1979 DTPA § 17.50A(e) (emphasis added).
303. The common law rule declaring compromise offers inadmissible as evidence is re-
plete with exceptions. See Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Watson, 491 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (evidence that defendant voluntarily paid for
damage to witness's automobile admissible for impeachment purposes to show bias or
prejudice); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Adams, 488 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (independent admission of liability admissible even though
coupled with an offer of compromise); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 366 S.W.2d 692, 694
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1963, no writ) (offer in settlement admissible to show due dili-
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based upon public policy considerations, is nevertheless a matter properly
within the sphere of the legislature. 3" It is well recognized that the legisla-
ture can, within certain limits, establish, change, or alter rules of evi-
dence. 30 5 Here the legislative restriction is designed to encourage out-of-
court settlement of claims by removing, insofar as practical, any fear that
the settlement offer will be used at trial.3 "6 Within constitutional limits,
30 7
such a restriction would appear to be valid. Until the scope of this legisla-
tive protection is established by judicial decisions, however, prudence dic-
tates that settlement offers in DTPA cases avoid admissions of liability or
discussions of other independent facts that might be admissible at common
law.
30 8
M. Section 17 SOB. Damages and Liability Defenses
Sections 17.50A provides a defense to treble damages. Sections
17.50B(a)-(c), on the other hand, provide a series of absolute defenses to
damages, attorneys' fees, and court costs,30 9 although not to injunctive re-
gence). See also FED. R. EvID. 408; Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F.
Supp. 499, 536-38 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aft'd, 519 F.2d 119, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975)
(settlement negotiations admissible if an integral part of the conspiracy).
304. Thompson v. McAllen Federated Woman's Bldg. Corp., 273 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ dism'd).
305. Gross v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 463, 465, 308 S.W.2d 54, 55 (1957); Mayes v. State,
145 Tex. Crim. 295, 298, 167 S.W.2d 745, 746 (1942); Floeck v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 314, 322,
30 S.W. 794, 796-97 (1895).
306. Cf., e.g., State v. Rankin, 445 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1969, no writ) ("[a]ny attempt by either party to negotiate and compromise may be done
without fear that such negotiations will be used against them in a subsequent suit").
307. There are constitutional limits, of course, to the legislature's power to prescribe rules
of evidence. See Mayes v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 295, 298-99, 167 S.W.2d 745, 746-47 (1942).
308. See Megarry Bros. v. United States, 404 F.2d 479, 485-86 (8th Cir. 1968); Charter
Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Adams, 488 S.W.2d 548, 549-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ
refd n.r.e.).
309. 1979 DTPA §§ 17.50B(a) & (c) provide:
(a) In an action brought under Section 17.50 of this subchapter, it is a
defense to the award of any damages or attorneys' fees if the defendant proves
that before consummation of the transaction he gave reasonable and timely
written notice to the plaintiff of the defendant's reliance on:
(1) written information relating to the particular goods or services in
question obtained from official government records if the written
information was false or inaccurate and the defendant did not
know and could not reasonably have known of the falsity or inac-
curacy of the information;(2) written information relating to the particular goods or services in
question obtained from another source if the information was
false or inaccurate and the defendant did not know and could not
reasonably have known of the falsity or inaccuracy of the infor-
mation; or
(3) written information concerning a test required or proscribed by a
government agency if the information from the test was false or
inaccurate and the defendant did not know and could not reason-
ably have known of the falsity or inaccuracy of the information.
(b) In asserting a defense under Subdivision (1), (2), or (3) of Subsection
(a) of Section 17.50B above, the defendant shall prove the written in-
formation was a producing cause of the alleged damage. A finding of




To establish a defense under section 17.50B(a), a defendant must prove
that prior to the consummation of the transaction, the consumer was given
written notice of the defendant's good faith reliance upon information sup-
plied by the government or a private source.3 1 ' Moreover, the defendant
must show that he did not know and could not reasonably have known of
the inaccuracy of the information.3 12 Finally, the defendant must prove
that the information relied upon was the producing cause of the alleged
damage.31 3
Adoption of section 17.50B signals a return to the common law rule that
imposes no liability for statements made on information and belief.3" 4
The DTPA, however, differs from the common law rule regarding such
statements in two significant respects. First, the DTPA requires that the
information relied upon be in writing. Under the common law, verbal as
well as written statements are defenses to liability.3 '5 Secondly, unlike the
common law, the 1979 amendments require the defendant to exercise rea-
sonable diligence in assessing whether the information conveyed to the
consumer is accurate and complete. 3 6 Hence, the defendant's unreasona-
ble reliance upon exaggerated or incomplete statements of a manufacturer
or government agency may not shield the defendant from liability.31 7
Once the defendant raises a section 17.50B(a) defense, the consumer
may bring suit against the third party supplying the information if it was
reasonably foreseeable that the information conveyed would reach the
fendant not the subject of the defensive finding under the subdivision
(1), (2), or (3) of the Subdivision (a) of Section 17.50B above was a
producing cause of damages of the plaintiff.
(c) In a suit where a defense is asserted under Subdivision (2) of Subsec-
tion (a) of Section 17.50B above, suit may be asserted against the third
party supplying the written information without regard to privity
where the third party knew or should have reasonably foreseen that the
information would be provided to a consumer; provided no double re-
covery may result.
310. Section 17.50B(a) speaks of actions brought under § 17.50; injunctive relief is sought
under § 17.48. Senator Meier stated his intent to the senate:
As the bill was laid out and discussed earlier, it had language in there that
these defenses go to the complete cause of action. In the revised language
we're talking about the defenses going to the award of damages or [attorneys']
fees.
For instance, in those instances where there could be a suit for injunctive
relief. [sic] There would not under these defenses apply a-a situation where
it would-they-they could arise by showing those, ah, items of fact being
within the defense, and prevent a suit for injunction.
Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 39.
311. 1979 DTPA §§ 17.50B(a)(l)-(3).
312. Id.
313. Id. § 17.50B(b).
314. See generall, Miller v. Esunas, 401 S.W.2d 150, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Foster v. L.M.S. Dev. Co., 346 S.W.2d 387, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1961, writ refd n.r.e.).
315. See Boles v. Aldridge, 107 Tex. 209, 175 S.W. 1052 (1915).
316. 1979 DTPA §§ 17.50B(a)(1)-(3).
317. See id.
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consumer.318 Whether a suit against the source of information must await
the defendant's raising a section 17.50B(a) defense or whether a suit can be
commenced independently against the source is unclear from the wording
of the statute. Since subsection (c) does not expressly limit suits against the
source of the information, it should be interpreted as allowing such suits if
there is a DTPA violation of a type that requires no privity under statutory
or common law.3 19 In cases where privity is required, the consumer could
bring suit against the third party source only after the section 17.50B(a)
defense is raised. If construed as requiring the plaintiff to delay suit
against the source in all cases until the defendant asserts a section 17.50B
defense, the amendment would be a marked departure from common law
fraud32 and would significantly limit the applicability of the DTPA.
Section 17.50B(d) provides an absolute defense to the cause of action,
rather than a defense just to damages, if the defendant proves that after he
received a specific complaint outlining the amount of actual damages, at-
torneys' fees, and court costs he tendered that total amount within thirty
days of his receipt of the notice.32' Under this section, unlike section
17.50A, a settlement offer is not sufficient. There must be a tender of "the
amount of actual damages claimed. ' 322 This defense would therefore ap-
pear to require a cash tender.323 A section 17.50B(d) defense is absolute
and, if proved by the defendant, the consumer's entire claim, including any
prayer for injunctive relief, must be dismissed.324 A consumer who pro-
ceeds with litigation notwithstanding proper tender by the defendant
under section 17.50B(d) may be exposing himself to a claim for attorneys'
fees on the basis that his suit was groundless and brought in bad faith.325
In the face of such a risk, a tender complying with the requirements of
section 17.50B(d) should end the lawsuit.
N. Section 1756 Venue
The 1979 amendments have significantly altered the venue provisions of
the Act.3 26 Prior to the amendments, the consumer could bring suit at the
defendant's residence or principal place of business, or where the defend-
318. Id. § 17.50B(c).
319. Privity is not required for breach of implied warranties under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80-83 (Tex. 1977), or in cer-
tain types of misrepresentation cases. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco,
130 Tex. 126, 129-30, 108 S.W.2d 432, 434, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937); Ford Motor Co.
v. Tidwell, 563 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (Nobility
Homes rule applied in breach of warranty-DTPA case). See also W. PROSSER, supra note
61, § 102, at 717-24; Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 655-57 (1977). Whether
privity is required for breach of express warranties is unclear.
320. See W. PROSSER, supra note 61, § 102, at 717-24; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 531, at 66 (1977).
321. 1979 DTPA § 17.50B(d).
322. Id. § 17.50B(d)(l).
323. See generally note 290 supra and accompanying text.
324. See 1979 DTPA § 17.50B(d).
325. 1977 DTPA § 17.50(c); see notes 256-64 supra and accompanying text.
326. 1979 DTPA § 17.56 provides:
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ant had done business.32 7 The phrase "had done business" was construed
to include every place reached by the defendant's mass solicitation;32
moreover, the statute was not limited to a specific period of time. Accord-
ingly, if the defendant had ever done business in a particular county, he
was subject to suit within that county for an indefinite period of time there-
after.
In an effort to define more narrowly the time period in which a suit
could be brought under the DTPA, the legislature amended section 17.56
by deleting the phrase "has done business" and substituting a provision
that allows suit in the county where the alleged practice occurred, where
the defendant had an established business at the time of suit, or where the
defendant solicited the transaction.3 29  The legislative history of the
amendments indicates that section 17.56 encompasses mass as well as per-
sonal solicitation, and that the defendant may be sued in any county in
which his advertising reaches a consumer. 33' Accordingly, advertising
throughout a state will subject a defendant to suit throughout the state.
The only meaningful limitation to venue under section 17.56 is that the
solicitation must be the subject of the suit. Thus, a consumer must prove
that the solicitation resulted in a transaction forming the basis for the suit
in addition to proving that the defendant advertised in the county where
the consumer resides. This requirement may prove a practical limitation
since many consumers may be unable to remember, or prove, which par-
ticular solicitation resulted in the transaction.
0. Section 17 56A." Statute of Limitations
Prior to the 1979 amendments, the DTPA contained no statute of limita-
tions of its own.33 ' If a statute contains no limitations period, the general
rule is that a suit to enforce an obligation created by the statute is treated
as an action for debt;332 thus, the limitations period for an action for debt
should also be applicable to a cause of action brought under the pre-
amendment DTPA. If the cause of action is not evidenced by or founded
upon a contract in writing, the two-year statute of limitations of article
An action brought which alleges a claim to relief under Section 17.50 of this
subchapter may be commenced in the county in which the person against
whom the suit is brought resides, has his principal place of business, or has a
fixed and established place of business at the time the suit is brought or in the
county in which the alleged act or practice occurred or in a county in which
the defendant or an authorized agent of the defendant solicited the transaction
made the subject of the action at bar.
327. 1977 DTPA § 17.56.
328. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
329. 1979 DTPA § 17.56.
330. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 49, at 25-31.
331. See 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, § 1, at 600; 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 62, § 1, at
149; 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § I, at 322.
332. See Rose v. First State Bank, 122 Tex. 298, 302, 59 S.W.2d 810, 811 (1933); Hol-
lingsworth v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 199 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1946,
writ refd), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 744 (1947). See also Green v. Wilkinson, 234 F.2d 120 (5th
Cir. 1956).
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5526 applies. 333 On the other hand, when the cause of action is evidenced
by or founded upon a contract in writing, it is governed by the four-year
statute contained in article 5527. 334
No reported cases to date have determined the appropriate limitations
period under the pre-amendment DTPA.33 5 Thus, in actions brought
under the Act prior to the 1979, amendments, the applicable limitations
period will probably depend on the nature of the cause of action asserted.
If the consumer sues to enforce an obligation,3 36 his suit will be treated as
an action for debt, as noted above. Therefore, if the consumer's cause of
action is one for damages based on alleged misrepresentations, the two-
year statute presumably would apply.3 37 If, however, the consumer's claim
is for equitable relief rather than damages, the general four-year limita-
tions period in article 5529 probably would control. 3
3 8
Breach of warranty claims under the old DTPA are most likely subject
to a four-year limitations period. If they involve the sale of goods, as de-
fined in the UCC, the claim would be governed by the express four-year
statute of limitations contained in section 2.725 of the Texas Business and
333. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958), provides in part: "There shall
be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued,
and not afterward, all actions or suits in court of the following description: .... 4. Ac-
tions for debt where the indebtedness is not evidenced by a contract in writing." See Rose v.
First State Bank, 122 Tex. 298, 302, 59 S.W.2d 810, 811 (1933); Overton v. City of Houston,
564 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
334. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958), provides in part: "There shall
be commenced and prosecuted within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued,
and not afterward, all actions or suits in court of the following description: 1. Actions for
debt where the indebtedness is evidenced by or founded upon any contract in writing." See
Kiel v. City of Houston, 558 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
The 1979 Texas Legislature has eliminated the distinction between causes of action evi-
denced by a contract in writing and those not evidenced by such a writing. 1979 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv., ch. 716, § 2, at 1769 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527
(Vernon Supp. 1980)). The four-year statute now applies to any action for debt. Id. This
amendment will have no effect on the limitations period of claims arising prior to its effec-
tive date, since the statute should be applied prospectively only. See TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 16; Ridyolph v. State, 545 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Claims arising after
the effective date of the amendment are specifically addressed by the 1979 DTPA. See notes
342-46 infra and accompanying text.
335. But see, e.g., W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 79-80 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which involved a DTPA claim and discusses the ap-
propriate limitations period for breach of warranty claims, but never discusses directly the
question of the appropriate limitations period for DTPA suits.
336. See 197SDTPA § 17.50(b), which permits a consumer who prevails in a suit filed
under § 17.50 to obtain "(2) an order enjoining such acts or failure to act; ... (4) any other
relief which the court deems proper" (emphasis added).
337. Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ); Lacy v.
Carson Manor Hotel, Inc., 297 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Pelton v. Trico Oil Co., 167 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942, no writ);
Sowell v. Hoffman, 182 S.W. 1152, 1154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, no writ).
338. See, e.g., Austin Lake Estates, Inc. v. Meyer, 557 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1977, no writ). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958) provides:
"Every action other than for the recovery of real estate, for which no limitation is otherwise
prescribed, shall be brought within four years next after the right to bring the same shall
have accrued and not afterward."
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Commerce Code.339 If, on the other hand, the claim involves a breach of
warranty in connection with a service based on a written contract, the four-
year period contained in article 5527 probably would apply.340 When the
breach of warranty results in a personal injury, however, Texas courts
have applied the two-year limitations period for injury done to the person
of another.34'
In the 1979 amendments the legislature purported to adopt a uniform
limitations period applicable to all DTPA claims in an apparent effort to
simplify the limitations issue. Section 17.56A now provides that a con-
sumer's suit under the Act must be commenced within two years after the
date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice occurred
or within two years after the consumer discovered or should have discov-
ered the occurrence of the deceptive act or practice.342 While purporting
to be applicable to "all actions brought under this subchapter," the section
makes express reference only to "all claims involving false, misleading or
deceptive acts or practices," and makes no reference to breach of warranty
claims, unconscionability claims, or insurance claims under article
21.21. 3  Because these claims do not appear to be covered by article
17.56A, 3"4 the courts may have to analogize to prior case law to determine
the applicable limitations periods for these claims.
The 1979 amendments further provide that the two-year statute of limi-
339. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See, e.g.,
W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.).
340. See, e.g., Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Bell, 422 S.W.2d 719, 720-21 (Tex. 1968).
341. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(b) (Vernon 1958); Holifield v. National
Cylinder Gas Div. of Chemetron Corp., 542 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Roberts v. General Dynamics, Convair Corp., 425 F. Supp. 688,
690-91 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
342. 1979 DTPA § 17.56A provides:
All actions brought under this subchapter must be commenced within two
years after the date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice
occurred or within two years after the consumer discovered or in the exercise
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the false,
misleading or deceptive act or practice. The period of limitation provided in
this section may be extended for a period of 180 days if the plaintiff proves
that failure timely to commence the action was caused by the defendant's
knowingly engaging in conduct solely calculated to induce the plaintiff to re-
frain from or postpone the commencement of the action.
343. See 1979 DTPA §§ 17.50(a)(2)-(4), which makes these claims actionable under the
DTPA.
344. Arguably, the legislature intended that these claims be included in their reference to
"false, misleading or deceptive acts or practices." This argument is supported by the fact
that the legislature has often been inconsistent in its references to these causes of actions.
Section 17.44, for example, states that the purpose of the Act is "to protect consumers against
false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of
warranty" but makes no reference to insurance claims. Section 17.44 could be read as indi-
cating that warranty claims are distinct from "deceptive business practices" (a phrase differ-
ent from the "deceptive trade practices" used elsewhere in the Act), but the laundry list
includes some DTPA violations that may overlap warranty claims under the DTPA. See id.
§ 17.46(b)(12) ("representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obli-
gations which it does not have"); id. § 17.46(b)(19) ("representing that a guarantee or war-
ranty confers or involves rights or remedies which it does not have").
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tations period may be extended 180 days when the consumer proves that
the defendant engaged in conduct calculated solely to induce the consumer
to refrain from filing suit under the Act.345 Because the consumer must
prove that the defendant's only reason for engaging in the particular con-
duct was to encourage the plaintiff to refrain from filing suit, the consumer
will be faced with a heavy burden of proof that may prove insurmountable
as a practical matter.
There is some question as to whether the 180-day exception was really
needed. The testimony on this provision in the legislative history indicates
that the legislature considered the likelihood of the plaintiffs being un-
fairly induced to allow limitations to run to be only an isolated problem.346
Nonetheless, the 180-day provision was enacted, perhaps out of an abun-
dance of caution. Although this provision is not likely to have any notice-
able impact on an appreciable number of suits under the Act, it may prove
helpful to the consumer in unusual circumstances.
III. CRITIQUE AND EVALUATION
The DTPA has been amended in every legislative session since its enact-
ment in 1973. 347 Unfortunately, this process has not improved the Act as
much as it has confirmed and even exaggerated its conflicting purposes.
What was initially described as a statute designed to give the consumer
speedy and adequate redress in cases too small to warrant litigation under
existing laws 348 has become something quite different: a statute that en-
croachs on and even threatens to displace existing law in such diverse ar-
eas as products liability, 349 malpractice, 350 real estate,351 banking,
352
securities, 5 insurance,354 and other areas.355
345. See note 342 supra.
346. State Affairs Committee Hearings, supra note 234, at 32.
347. See, e.g., Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer
Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1976) (1975 amendments); Comment, Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, supra note 281 (1977 amendments).
348. Hill, supra note 5, at 614.
349. See, e.g., Avery v. Maremont Corp., No. S-75-91-CA (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 1978) (suit
under the DTPA to recover for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the sale and
advertising of defective shock absorbers).
350. See Comment, The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act." Ap-
plication to Professional Malpractice, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 763 (1977).
351. See, e.g., Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 667-68 (Tex. 1977) (sale of home);
Tate v. Wiggins, 583 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ) (sale of lakeside
lots).
352. See, e.g., Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1978, writ granted); Thompson v. First Austin Co., 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
353. See Commercial Trading Corp. v. Searsy, 559 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1977), rev'd, 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1978) (DTPA claim for misrepresentation in
sale of commodity options considered only by court of appeals). See also Bourland v. State,
528 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (sale of memberships in
country club and stock in corporation).
354. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979); Lone
Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.).
355. The law of sales, while certainly a proper area for a consumer protection act, is
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The problem is one of overreaching. The original Act contained no lim-
itation on the size of the transaction or on the type of consumer goods
covered. Accordingly, the remedy of treble damages for breach of war-
ranty or for innocent misrepresentations, which was a justifiable incentive
to litigation for plaintiffs involved in relatively small consumer purchases,
was extended to large commercial transactions where the treble damage
sanction had no readily discernible justification. 356 Treble damages were
also made available in suits against private individuals, the so-called occa-
sional seller, and even for innocent misrepresentations in the sale of used
goods.357 Treble damages seem unjustified in such circumstances, particu-
larly since the non-merchant-seller is often as unsophisticated as the con-
sumer to whom he sells and since he is almost by definition a one-time
offender. Authorizing treble damages in such circumstances is therefore
unlikely to produce any kind of meaningful deterrence and is more likely
to impose considerable hardship on an individual who is himself a con-
sumer in almost every other transaction.
The 1975 amendments aggravated these inconsistencies between the
Act's purposes and its effects; those amendments broadened the definition
of consumer to include partnerships and cororations and enlarged the
definition of goods to include real property.35T The amendments thereby
further extended the Act's application to commercial litigation. Although
these changes enlarged the Act's coverage to include transactions that were
likely to be increasingly displaced or bypassed by the DTPA due to its more attractive pen-
alties. Breach of warranty claims, for example, are likely to be brought with increasing
frequency under the DTPA instead of under the UCC. See, e.g., O'Shea v. International
Business Mach. Corp., 578 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (purchase of typewriter); Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) (purchase of used automobile); Preston v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 573 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purchase of
washing machine); Allen v. Parsons, 555 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ
granted) (purchase of used pickup truck).
356. See Note, supra note 6, at 222-23. The author notes:
The amounts in controversy in commercial transactions are normally large
enough to justify the costs of litigation without an added incentive of treble
damages. Arguably, in a commercial context, a mandatory trebling of dam-
ages serves little function in furthering the purposes of the DTPA and could
cause harsh, inequitable results in instances where there was no intentional or
malicious action by the defendant.
(Footnotes omitted.) Witnesses before the legislature also stated that they did not under-
stand the purpose for treble damages for innocent misrepresentations. See Testimony on
Economic Development, supra note 1, tape i, at 21. One witness stated:
I tried to figure out what the purpose of those treble damages were. . . for an
innocent misrepresentation and I haven't come up with one. If we're trying to
stop people from making mistakes and that sort of thing I hardly see that
treble damages for someone that didn't know that they were making a mis-
take, are applicable.
(Testimony of Ron Habitzreiter).
357. See Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
filed).
358. See Bragg, supra note 347, at I. Even though real estate transactions were probably
covered by the Act as originally enacted, see Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 667-68




likely to involve substantial monetary claims, no effort was made to adjust
the Act's sanctions accordingly.
In 1977, the process of legislative expansion continued and the coverage
of the Act was broadened even further. The definition of "services" was
amended to eliminate the restriction to services for "other than commer-
cial or business use."-35 9 Commercial and business services were thereby
brought within the Act. The definition of "merchant" was removed from
the Act.360 This change eliminated another impediment to suits by busi-
nesses and permitted awarding treble damages for innocent misrepresenta-
tions in almost all commercial transactions. Although the 1977
amendments also added some defenses to treble damages,' the defenses
did little to moderate the effects of treble damages in most transactions
362
and, of course, had no effect on the increasingly expansive scope of the
Act.
The 1979 amendments reflect an adverse reaction to the all-encompass-
ing reach of the DTPA, but do not actually diminish the Act's coverage.
The new amendments add a scienter requirement as a precondition to
treble damages, and moderate the penalties under the Act by making puni-
tive damages in excess of $2,000 discretionary with the jury. Nevertheless,
the opponents of extending the Act's coverage were unable to prevent yet
another significant expansion: the disclosure requirement of section
17.46(b)(23). If the growth of litigation under rule lOb-5 of the federal
securities laws is any guide,36 3 then a whole new dimension of liability has
been added by this disclosure requirement.
As it stands today, the DTPA covers too much legal territory with too
little flexibility, in both its sanctions and standards of culpability, to deal
justly and fairly with the many diverse situations in which it may be in-
voked. The housewife seeking redress for a defective toaster, the victim of
an automobile collision seeking redress for personal injuries, the real estate
syndicate suing for defects in title or illegal restrictive covenants in a newly
acquired shopping center, and the client or patient whose representation or
treatment is inadequate or unprofessional are all consumers in the
broadest sense and are all entitled to legal protection. However, whether
they all need treble damages and attorneys' fees for their grievances,
whether they all need relaxed standards of causation, and whether they all
need additional affirmative disclosure protection is another matter entirely.
The differences in the sophistication and financial resources of the various
plaintiffs, the degrees of culpability of the various defendants and the wide
range of complexity in the different transactions make it difficult to achieve
uniform standards and remedies that are equally suited to a fair disposi-
359. See Comment, Deceptipe Trade Practices Act, supra note 281, at 525.
360. Id. at 531. Governmental entities were included in the term "consumer." Id. at
526.
361. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, § 6, at 604 (1977 DTPA § 17.50A).
362. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
363. See I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 1.1, at 5 (1967).
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tion of each type of case. The shortcomings of the DTPA are grounded in
an insensitivity to these differences.
Although it may not be politically feasible to make the large scale revi-
sions in the DTPA that are necessary to accommodate these differences,
such accommodation is possible-by reversing the expansive coverage of
the Act and excluding areas where coverage does not seem appropriate, by
increasing the Act's reliance on existing legal standards, or by limiting the
Act to claims below a stated dollar amount. The last alternative is particu-
larly promising because it would be least destructive of the consumer's
rights and would answer many of the objections made to the Act in this
last legislative session. Furthermore, limiting the size of claims that could
be brought under the Act would restore the Act to its original purpose of
serving the needs of the average consumer. In its present form, the Act is
as much a device for introducing treble damages into large business or
commercial litigation as it is a means for obtaining redress in the many
small transactions that consumers enter regularly.
In addition to the need for a general change in the Act's applicability,
there is also a need for revision on a more selective basis. For example, as
previously noted, the section imposing liability for omissions should be
carefully reevaluated, and the plight of the occasional seller who lacks an
organized constituency to speak on his behalf should be addressed. The
legislature should also reconsider its adoption of a "producing cause" stan-
dard in DTPA cases. The producing cause standard was originally devel-
oped in the area of products liability for personal injuries, but is now being
utilized in DTPA cases to redress purely economic harm. Because it is
questionable whether the Act should be extended to cover personal inju-
ries, and because recovery of large unforeseeable consequential damages is
of questionable benefit to the average consumer, but a potentially serious
threat to small businesses, a proximate cause standard, containing as it
does a foreseeability test, should be reintroduced into the Act. Moreover,
claims for mental anguish should not be allowed under the DTPA, partic-
ularly in connection with any claim for which treble or punitive damages
are also available.
The tender provisions should also be extensively revised to discourage
inflated consumer demands and to make the conciliation procedure a
workable one. In addition to developing a mechanism for discouraging
excessive demands, the legislature should extend the period for responding
to the consumer's demand, possibly to within thirty days after suit is filed.
One of the reasons that the present tender provision is producing so few
settlements is that the thirty-day tender period frequently runs before the
defendant is even aware of its significance. In fact, in almost all instances
that the authors are aware of, the clients do not even refer the demand
letters to their attorneys until the thirty-day tender period has expired. In
such cases, the incentive to prompt settlement that the Act tries to create is
nullified. Furthermore, consideration should be given to making the
tender provision of section 17.50B an offer of settlement rather than a
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tender of damages provision, and to requiring the tender of expenses in all
settlement offers. The reasons, if any, for requiring a cash tender under
section 17.50B, and for eliminating expenses from tenders under section
17.50A(c) are not readily apparent.
The need for treble damages in certain types of breach of warranty cases
should also be reexamined. Such damages may be appropriate for cases in
which the seller makes knowingly false claims about goods or services or
sells them knowing them to be defective. Treble damages do not seem
appropriate, however, for legitimate disputes over warranty coverage.
Thus, in situations where there is a legitimate warranty dispute, actual
damages plus attorneys' fees may be a more appropriate remedy than
treble damages.
Finally, the legislature needs to assess carefully the implications of class
actions under the Act. As originally drafted in 1973, the Act contained a
class action provision that limited class action recoveries to actual damages
only.3" In 1977, the class action provision was deleted from the Act, but
the Texas Supreme Court revised rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in September of that year allowing class actions of the "spurious"
type for the first time in Texas. 365 Because rule 42 contains no limitation
on the type of damages that may be recovered under it, the net effect of
these changes is that class actions can now be maintained under the DTPA
for treble damages instead of actual damages as long as the particular case
meets the requirements of the rule.
The 1977 legislative history shows no awareness that the repeal of the
class action provisions would result in class actions under the Act for treble
damages, or that the supreme court, in adopting the class action rule, had
considered treble damage actions under the DTPA. 366 The situation is
therefore somewhat reminiscent of the problems that developed under the
Truth-in-Lending Act: although the implications of class action recoveries
in Truth-in-Lending cases were not anticipated by Congress,367 suits for
tens of millions 368 and even billions of dollars were soon filed.369 When
364. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 327.
365. See Civil Procedure Rules Amendment-Official Court Order, 40 TEX. B.J. 563
(1977). The so-called "spurious" class action had been held to be unavailable under the old
class action rule. See Commercial Travelers Life Ins. Co. v. Spears, 484 S.W.2d 577, 579
(Tex. 1972).
366. Rule 42 in its present form was originally proposed in an article in the Houston Law
Review. See Jaworski & Padgett, The Class Action in Texas." An Examination and a Propo-
sal, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1005 (1975). The article was a preliminary response to a request by
the supreme court to the state bar for a revision of rule 42. Id. at 1007. The supreme court
seems to have adopted the amendments suggested by the article without change. Apart from
one brief reference to the DTPA, which at that time contained its own class action provision
limited to single damage recoveries, the article makes no mention of the possible interaction
between a revised class action rule and statutes imposing penalty damages. Accordingly, it
is likely that the potential for enormous class action recoveries under the DTPA was not
considered by the supreme court when the amendments to the rule were adopted.
367. See Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 611 (N.D. I11. 1973).
368. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(potential class action recovery of approximately $13,000,000).
369. See Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642,(S.D. Fla. 1972) (potential recov-
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the magnitude of the problem became apparent, Congress quickly enacted
legislation placing a ceiling on class action recoveries in such cases.
370
Efforts were made in this past legislative session to limit class actions in
DTPA cases to actions by the attorney general. 37' That effort was success-
fully resisted by consumer groups, however, and no change in the availa-
bility of class actions under the Act was accomplished. The issue was not
so much resolved as postponed.
The present status of class actions under the Act is not satisfactory. In
cases arising between 1977 and the effective date of the 1979 amendments
enormous liabilities for essentially innocent conduct may arise under the
Act. Innocent conduct may also result in excessive class action recoveries
under the amended Act since automatic trebling is retained for the first
$1,000 of actual damages, irrespective of the defendent's state of mind in
committing the violation. Because treble damages in such circumstances
serve primarily as an incentive to litigate small claims, and because class
actions also serve to encourage litigation of small claims, consumer protec-
tion does not need both incentives. Permitting the two to be used together
can easily result in excessive punishment and overdeterrence.372 Fortu-
nately, a great deal of room for compromise still exists on this issue; pos-
sibilities include a return to class actions for actual damages only, or the
creation of maximum recoveries similar to those adopted in Truth-in-
Lending cases. 3 7
3
The Texas Supreme Court could also act to alleviate the problem that its
adoption of an expanded class action rule helped to create. The New York
Court of Appeals, in modernizing and expanding the coverage of its class
action rule, provided that no punitive damages could be recovered under
the rule without express authorization from the legislature.374 This provi-
sion forces debate about and careful legislative consideration of the merits
of large punitive class action recoveries, a process that appears to have
been bypassed in Texas.
ery of one billion dollars); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 92 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (potential recovery of eight billion dollars).
370. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 28, 1974,
§ 408, 88 Stat. 1500, 1518, amended by Act of Mar. 23, 1976, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 257, 260), which
imposes a ceiling of $500,000 in class actions under the Truth-in-Lending Act.
371. Senate Bill 357 as originally passed by the senate contained a provision that stated:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of civil procedure, a class action may
not be brought under Subchapter E of this chapter except by the attorney general." This
provision was deleted from the amendments as finally adopted by the legislature.
372. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1361-62
(1976) ("The increased deterrent effect class actions create may intensify the already height-
ened deterrent effect of a penalty provision, to a point perhaps counter-productive to statu-
tory policies. Class actions under the original Truth in Lending Act provide an obvious
example." (Footnote omitted.)).
373. See note 370 supra.
374. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 901(b) (McKinney 1976). This provision specifically
prohibits recovery of penalties in class actions, unless the statute creating the penalty or
minimum recovery explicitly authorizes class actions. See also Wesley v. John Mullins &




The 1979 amendments to the DTPA add considerable complexity to an
already difficult statute. It is doubtful, however, that the amendment proc-
ess has yet run its course. If a more permanent version of the Act is ever to
be adopted, it must be based on a finer balance between the needs of the
consumer and the needs of the business community than has thus far been
achieved.
The DTPA has developed on a battleground between contending politi-
cal factions, each seeking a temporary legal advantage. Yet as one of the
participants has noted, there are no white knights and black knights in this
struggle.175 The issues to be resolved are far too complex and diverse to be
resolved on the basis that all legislative changes that expand consumer
rights are good and all changes that protect business interests are bad. The
DTPA is a "grand experiment." '376 If it is to become something more than
that, the interested parties must search more diligently for common
ground.
375. See Hearings on Economic Development, supra note 1, tape 1, at 21 (testimony of
Ron Habitzreiter) ("My own feeling about the Act is that it's really . . . you don't have
white knights and black knights. If that was the case, probably every case would be set-
tled.").
376. Lynn, supra note 66, at 884.
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